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NOTES
THE STARBUCKS DECISION OF THE
SHANGHAI No. 2 INTERMEDIATE
PEOPLE'S COURT: A VICTORY LIMITED
TO LATT ES?
INTRODUCTION
Fendi, Gucci, Louis Vuitton. Truck-loads of goods bearing
luxurious brand names are available for purchase in Beijing's Silk
Street mall, just a short distance away from the U.S. Embassy.! Better
yet, the prices are negotiable and well below retail. There is only one
catch: an astounding number are counterfeit goods. Still, for many a
budget-conscious fashionista, this may sound like a dream come true.
But could the dream be coming to an end? 2
In December 2005, at the conclusion of Starbucks' trademark-
infringement suit against a small Shanghai company, Xingbake
Coffee Shop, Ltd. (Shanghai Xingbake), a local Chinese court found
in favor of the famous American coffee powerhouse.3 In what many
have deemed a landmark ruling,4 the court ordered Shanghai
I See Matthew Forney, Faking It, TIME, June 6, 2005, http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,1069142,00.html. The mall on Silk Street is the successor to Silk
Alley-"probably the world's most infamous market for fake consumer goods." Id. Silk Alley
was so infamous, in fact, that Lonely Planet's guidebook to Beijing lists it as a shopping
destination where travelers may find expertly copied designer goods on the cheap. id. Though
the Chinese government tore the market down in January 2005, there now stands in its place "a
five-floor department store packed with four times as many vendors selling fakes as there were
in the old alley." Id.
2 See discussion infra Part IlI.C.
3 Yin Ping, Judge Rules for Starbucks in Copyright Violation Case, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 2,
2006, at 3, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-01/02/content_
508672.htm.
4 See, e.g., Jessica Wong, Note, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in
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Xingbake to stop using the name "Xingbake," a Chinese version of
the word "Starbucks," and its logo-a green and white design the
court found confusingly similar to Starbucks' famous logo. 5 It also
ordered Shanghai Xingbake to pay Starbucks approximately $62,500
in damages-the maximum under Chinese trademark law.6 Many
commentators have characterized this court's decision granting
exclusive trademark rights to Starbucks as a very significant victory
for multinational companies seeking protection for their famous
marks in China.7
For years, foreign investors have looked longingly to China as "the
last great commercial frontier.",8 With its vast population of over one
billion, rapidly developing economy, and burgeoning middle class,
China appears to offer a world of financial opportunity to
multinational enterprises seeking to invest in a new market.
9
However, many such investors have been reluctant to invest and
expand seriously in China because of the country's comparatively
weak intellectual-property laws' ° and often laughable enforcement
Protecting Their Well-Known Marks, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 937, 958 (2006) (describing the
case as "an important victory for Starbucks and China"); Starbucks Wins Chinese Logo Case,
BBC NEWS, Jan. 2, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hilbusiness/4574400.stm (dubbing the case "a
landmark in China, where foreign firms have for years complained of piracy"); David Eimer,
China's Fake "Starbucks'" is Banned from Using Name, INDEP. (London), Jan. 3, 2006,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/chinas-fake-starbucks-is-banned- from-using-
name-521502.html (touting the "landmark judgment" as an indication that China may finally
crack down on intellectual-property theft).
5 Ping, supra note 3.
6 Id.
7 See Wong, supra note 4, at 958 (characterizing the decision as "good news for potential
investors" and evidence that "the tides may be turning" with regard to apparent favoritism in
Chinese courts toward local parties in trademark-infringement actions); Mure Dickie, Battle for
Coffee Logo as Rivals Stir up Trouble, AuSTRALIAN, Jan. 4, 2006, at 20, available at 2006
WLNR 95201 (predicting that the decision will "hearten the many other foreign companies in
China that face competition from local companies imitating their brands, trademarks, logos or
packaging"); accord Kathleen E. McLaughlin, Starbucks Wins Trademark Cases in Two
Chinese Cities, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, Jan. 6, 2006 (quoting the president
of the Asia-Pacific Group in Starbucks Coffee International as saying that the Starbucks
decision "demonstrates the importance of protecting the value and ownership of intellectual
property rights in greater China, including well-known brands like Starbucks").
8 George 0. White III, Enter the Dragon: Foreign Direct Investment Laws and Policies
in the P.R.C., 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 35, 35 (2003).
9 Jessica Jiong Zhou, Trademark Law and Enforcement in China: A Transnational
Perspective, 20 WiS. INT'L L.J. 415,415 (2002) (noting that the potential for great financial gain
has not been lost on counterfeiters and that many multinational investors seeking to invest in
China "have found much to their surprise, that their goods are already available in China-or at
least, counterfeits of their goods").
10 As discussed in further detail below, China's intellectual-property laws are now
basically in accordance with international requirements. However, the definition of what
constitutes a well-known mark under the new intellectual-property laws is still somewhat
ambiguous. A clear definition on this point is important to multinational investors seeking to
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practices." Since many multinational companies consider their
intellectual property-especially their famous marks-to be their
most valuable assets,' 2 it is not surprising that they are wary of
investing in a market where protection for these assets may be
virtually nonexistent.
On its face, the Starbucks decision, as well as China's other recent
intellectual-property-law amendments and attempts to improve
enforcement, 13 may appear to demonstrate that China is moving
toward greater overall protection of foreign intellectual property. Yet
the decision will likely prove to be a bark with minimal bite. There
are many reasons for this. For example, what constitutes a well-
known mark in China is still ambiguous. 14 Chinese courts and
administrative agencies have afforded some famous foreign marks
protection in China by declaring that they are well-known but have
denied recognition for many other seemingly famous marks without
explaining the disparity. Moreover, in many cases, China appears to
have a preference for granting "well-known mark" protection to
domestic companies over foreign mark holders.' 5 Without more
guidance as to what kinds of foreign marks the Chinese courts will
consider to be well-known, multinational investors will continue to
demonstrate a reluctance to funnel money toward projects in China,
expand in China because it may determine whether or not their marks will be recognized at all
under Chinese law. See discussion infra Parts I.C.-D.
1 See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32
OHIO N.U. L. REv. 203, 212-13 (2006).
12 For instance, analysts value the word "Nike" alone at seven billion dollars. James
Glieck, Get Out of M Namespace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2004, (Magazine), at 44. Most
multinational companies value their intellectual-property rights even more highly than the
products they sell. A top lawyer at Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., the world's largest chewing gum
manufacturer, noted that Wrigley's most important asset "is not chewing gum, but intellectual
property-world famous marks like Juicy Fruit, Doublemint, Big Red and Spearmint." William
C. Smith, Battling Piracy, 24 NAT'L L. J., July 8, 2002, at A15.
13 As discussed below, China has revamped its trademark laws several times over the past
twenty-five years in an effort to comply with its international obligations. See discussion infra
Part I.C.
14 See, e.g., Wong, supra note 4, at 961 (while "the 2001 [Trademark Law] provides a
number of factors to consider in determining if a mark is well known.... [T]he definition and
the factors remain broad and subjective, allowing for interpretation by the courts and
administrative agencies"). Examples of this vagueness and its effects are given below. See infra
Parts I.C.-D.
15 For instance, in 2004, China's State Trademark Office granted forty-three domestic and
international trademarks well-known protection under the new implementing regulations of the
2001 Trademark Law. Alisa Cahan, Note, China's Protection of Famous and Well-Known
Marks: The Impact of China's Latest Trademark Law Reform on Infringement and Remedies, 12
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 219, 231-32 (2004). Out of these, forty were owned by Chinese
companies, one was owned by a Taiwanese company, and only two-Coca-Cola and Gillette-
were owned by American companies. Id. at 232.
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since such activity could result in these companies' losing millions of
dollars.
16
Further, China's trademark infringement problem is widespread
and deeply entrenched. 17 Some local Chinese economies depend upon
the manufacture or sale of counterfeit goods.18 Both they and China as
a whole benefit from the export of these goods and the revenues they
generate when sold domestically.' 9 As a result, China has limited
incentive to find and implement truly effective solutions to the
trademark infringement occurring within its borders.2 °
Granting Starbucks trademark rights, moreover, allows China to
convey the impression to foreign multinational investors that it is
tightening intellectual-property protection without really having to
crack down on the larger underlying problem. This is thanks largely
to the uniqueness of Starbucks. Starbucks thrives in urban areas with
busy street corners21 where the local economies are not dependent
upon one particular market-namely, a market dependent on
counterfeit goods.22 China may find it much easier to grant trademark
rights to a company such as Starbucks whose exclusive trademark
rights are not likely to wipe out the livelihood of an entire
community.
Additionally, while many counterfeit goods in China are easily
exportable, small consumer items such as cell phones, handbags, and
16 Daniel C.K. Chow, Enforcement Against Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of
China, 20 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 447,448 (2000). Professor Chow writes:
"[tihere is no scientific method to measure the size of the counterfeiting problem in
China. Counterfeiters operate their illegal trade in underground factories and through
criminal organizations. As a result, only partial information is available and some
extrapolations must be made, but based on available information, the size of China's
consumer economy ($352.7 billion in annual sales), the percentage of total sales
reported to be lost from counterfeiting from industry groups (15-20% for some
brands), total losses suffered to counterfeiting by US companies worldwide (S200
billion), and China's role as a leading source of counterfeit products-it is
reasonable to assume that the total value of counterfeit products that are available in
or originating from China are in the billions or even tens of billions per year."
Id. at 448 n.3.
17 See Chow, supra note 11, at 203-204.
IS Id. at 218-220; see also Sandy Meng-Shan Liu, After WTO Accession: China's
Dilemma with the Trafficking of Fakes, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1153, 1154-55 (2003).
19 Chow, supra note 11, at 203-204.
20 Id.
21 Geoffrey A. Fowler, Converting the Masses: Starbucks in China, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
July 17, 2003, available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/culturalI2003/0710starbucks.
htm.
22 See Chow, supra note II, at 218-220 (describing the dependence of Yiwu's economy
upon trade in counterfeit goods and noting the existence of at least one hundred other towns like
it involved in counterfeiting).
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cosmetics,23 Starbucks' dominant product-freshly prepared coffee-
is meant to be consumed on the spot as part of a larger aesthetic
experience. Though virtually all modem consumer goods are meant
to communicate a certain lifestyle, many Chinese counterfeit goods
are indistinguishable from the real thing.25 These identical goods
make it possible for consumers to demonstrate brand loyalty without
having to pay a higher price for the authentic good. Once Starbucks
establishes itself in the Chinese market, however, it will be difficult
for copycats to duplicate convincingly Starbucks' particular brand of
aesthetic and appeal.26 In short, China had a lot to gain-and very
little to lose-by finding in favor of Starbucks; the same does not
hold true for all other foreign multinational entities. Given these
differences, as well as several other problems peculiar to China, time
will likely show that the Starbucks decision did not produce quite the
splash, with regard to foreign trademark rights, that many foreign
investors hoped it would.
This Note illustrates the limited importance of the Starbucks
decision to the greater overall climate of foreign trademark protection
in China, in light of the nature of Starbucks' goods and the other
problems China faces regarding the protection of foreign well-known
marks. Part I of this Note provides a brief history of trademark
protection in China, the various attempts China has made in recent
years to strengthen protection for foreign brands, in order to better
comply with its international obligations, and the trademark
infringement problems China continues to face despite
implementation of new protection laws. Part II outlines the details of
the Starbucks decision. Finally, Part III discusses the likely impotence
of the Starbucks decision, given the uniqueness of Starbucks' goods,
the rampant problems of enforcement in China, and the benefits
China receives from continued trademark infringement.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Cultural Origins of Chinese Intellectual-Property Rights
Until recently, China has done little to protect intellectual property.
Though the reasons for this are many, China's historic paucity of
23 Id.
24 See generally Susan Dominus, The Starbucks Aesthetic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006.
25 See, e.g., Forney, supra note I (observing that while few of the goods at Beijing's Silk
Alley are authentic, most are "so meticulously duplicated by Chinese manufacturers that no one
could tell the difference.").
26 Fowler, supra note 21.
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intellectual-property protections may be attributed in part to the fact
that Confucian principles dominated social thought in China for much
of its long history. 27 These ideas emphasized the importance of
community well-being over the pursuit of individual reward28 and
encouraged borrowing from classic works of literature and art without
giving them formal credit.29 According to traditional Confucian
ideals, copying was sacred and considered to be the ultimate act of
praise for the original work's creator.3 It was also thought to be a
scholarly enterprise, capable of instilling wisdom in and commanding
tremendous respect for both the copyist and his community.3'
In spite of the fact that these widely accepted principles in Chinese
culture ran largely counter to Western concepts of intellectual
property, China managed to implement some legal protection for
creative advancement. The general concept of trademarks appeared as
early as the Northern Zhou Dynasty (556-580 A.D.) in China, and the
first Chinese law regarding intellectual property was adopted during
the Tang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.). 3 2 China's first formal trademark
law protecting the economic goodwill companies developed in their
business marks was enacted in 1904 under the Qing Dynasty (1644-
1912 A.D.).33 However, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
came to power in 1949, existing intellectual property laws were
abrogated or substantially amended, 4 and all property came to be
state-owned. This phenomenon, coupled with the CCP's
27 Andrew Evans, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO, TRIPS and Chinese
Amendments to Intellectual Property Laws, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 587, 589 (2003) (noting
that Confucian thought permeated Chinese culture from about 100 B.C. to 1911 A.D.).
28 Id.
29 Amanda S. Reid, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries:
China as a Case Study, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 63, 90 (2003).
30 Liu, supra note 18, at 1156.
31 Id.
32 Wong, supra note 4, at 940.
33 Michael N. Schlesinger, Note, A Sleeping Giant Awakens: The Development of
Intellectual Property Law in China, 9 J. CHINESE L. 93, 99-100 (1995) (citing Mark Sidel,
Copyright, Trademark, and Patent Law in the PRC, 21 TEX. INT'L L.J. 259, 269 (1986), who
notes that Western officials had a role in drafting China's first modem trademark law in 1904).
The term "economic goodwill" refers to a company's intangible assets-such as brand
recognition, good reputation, and business connections-that help it to compete with other
companies in the business market.
3 The new Communist government considered trademarks principally to be a measure of
a product's quality, rather than a form of property meriting protection under the law. See id.
(describing the replacement of existing trademark laws following the establishment of the
People's Republic of China in 1950 "with rules designed to protect consumers by making the
right of trademark contingent upon the trademark owner maintaining strict control of product
quality"). One such trademark law provided that trademark registrations could be canceled if
goods bearing the marks did not meet a prescribed quality standard or if "masses of people"
demanded the marks' cancellation. Id. (citing Measures for the Control of Trade Marks (adopted
Apr. 10, 1963), art. 11, translated in 62 PAT. & TRADEMARK REV. 249 (1964)).
35 See Kristie M. Kachuriak, Chinese Copyright Piracy: Analysis of the Problem and
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incorporation of many Confucian ideas into its ideology, greatly
disserved those seeking protection for the fruits of their intellect.
B. An Apparent Shift Toward Recognition of Intellectual Property
Rights in China
Driven largely by pressures from the international community to
strengthen its intellectual property protection and by its own desire to
attract foreign investment in order to eventually dominate the global
marketplace,36 China has revamped vastly its treatment of intellectual
property over the past twenty-five years. In 1982, China adopted the
Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC),37 in order
"to improve management of trademarks, to protect exclusive rights of
trademark owners and to encourage manufacturers to guarantee the
quality of their goods and maintain the reputation of their
trademarks., 38 The 1982 Trademark Law protected a trademark
owner's exclusive right to use its registered mark and provided a
private right of action for infringement. 39 It was also based on a "first-
to-file" system, meaning that the first applicant to register a trademark
with the local Administration of Industry and Commerce (AIC) is
held to be the valid owner of the mark.40 This system differs from the
basic system of trademark ownership in the United States, where
valid ownership generally inheres in the first to use the trademark,
Suggestions for Protection of U.S. Copyrights, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 599, 603 (1995) ("Chinese
Communists believed that property should be collectively owned by the state to eliminate class
inequities.").
36 See Chow, supra note 11, at 208 (arguing that "China's ambitions [in the global
economy] are vast: China seeks to maintain its dominance in labor-intensive sectors, to gain and
maintain dominance in low-technology sectors, and to eventually dominate trade in high-
technology sectors. In other words, China's national goal is to become a dominant economic
power in all sectors as quickly as possible.").
37 See Evans, supra note 27, at 589-90 (citing Julia Cheng, China's Copyright System:
Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS Requires an Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1941, 1952 (1998)) (noting that China's adoption of an "open door" policy with
regard to international trade in 1979-which subsequently caused it to promulgate new
intellectual-property laws-may have initially attracted to China counterfeiters who were eager
to take advantage of China's new cheap-labor market).
38 Cahan, supra note 15, at 224 (quoting Rory J. Radding, Enforcement of the Trademark
Law in China, INT'L L. PRACTICUM, Spring 1998, at 5, 7).
39 Paul B. Birden, Jr., Trademark Protection in China: Trends and Directions, 18 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 431,458 (1996) (citing Trademark Law, art. 3, CHINA L. FOREIGN Bus.
(CCH) 11-500 (Aug. 22, 1982)). The 1982 PRC Trademark Law provided no definition for
what constitutes a trademark and failed to mention both service marks and "collective marks,"
marks that groups or associations used. Id. Also, although it provided for a private right of
action for infringement, at the time that the 1982 PRC Trademark Law was adopted, most
Chinese companies were government-owned, with the result that competition and infringement
among them were low. Id.
40 Cahan, supra note 15, at 225.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
rather than in the first to register it.41 This fundamental difference has
been of great concern to many multinational companies whose marks
are not yet registered in China, but who desire to expand there
without fear that their trademarks might be freely infringed.42 Though
China amended its trademark law in both 1993 and 2001, the basic
"first-to-file" system is still in place.
43
One commentator has suggested that the 1982 Trademark Law was
"more... an instrument of government control and quality assurance
than an application of proprietary rights to intellectual property."" In
any case, the 1982 Law and its accompanying implemental
regulations have proven to be ineffective and have failed to meet
international standards. 45 As noted above, one of China's principal
concerns in implementing intellectual-property laws is compliance
with the intellectual-property-protection norms mandated by
international law.46 In order to better accomplish this goal, China
adopted the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
4' This system derived from the common law. See Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcom, 150 U.S.
460, 463-64 (1893) (declaring that "the exclusive right to the use of the mark or device claimed
as a trade-mark is founded on priority of appropriation; that is to say, the claimant of the
trademark must have been the first to use or employ the same on like articles of production.").
"Use" as a prerequisite to trademark ownership is now codified throughout the Lanham Act as
well. See, e.g., Lanham Act § l(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2002) (providing that "[t]he
owner of a trademark used in commerce may request registration of its trademark") (emphasis
added); see also Lanham Act § 32(l)(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (2005) (limiting trademark-
infringement causes of action to unauthorized uses in commerce); Lanham Act § 43(a)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006) (same). However, there are some exceptions to this general
American rule. For instance, a federal registration provides "constructive notice of the
registrant's claim of ownership" and gives the registrant the "exclusive right to use the.., mark
in commerce." See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir.
1959). As such, a federal registration "affords nationwide protection to registered marks,
regardless of the areas in which the registrant actually uses the mark." Id. This means that the
owner of a federal registrant may be entitled to enjoin any concurrent uses of its mark anywhere
in the United States, even if the owner is not yet using its mark in a particular market area,
simply upon a "proper showing of an intent to use the mark.., in [that] market area." Id. at 365.
42 Cahan, supra note 15, at 224.
43 See Trademark Law, ch. 3, art. 29, translated at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/
laws/lawsl 1.htm [hereinafter 2001 Trademark Law]; see also EMBASSY OF THE UNITED
STATES: BEIJING, CHINA, IPR REPORT: TRADEMARK: LEGISLATION, http://beijing.usembassy-
china.org.cn/iprtrade.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2008) ("China has a 'first-to-file' system that
requires no evidence of prior use or ownership, leaving registration of popular foreign marks
open to third parties.").
44 Liu, supra note 18, at 1166.
45 This was due largely to lax enforcement on the part of Chinese officials, who may have
believed that they were acting in the national interest. One commentator explains that allowing
"trademark infringement provided cheap access to goods and expensive technology[,] ...
enhanced the nation's foreign exchange posture by lessening the drain of foreign intellectual
property royalties and repatriation of profits, promoted domestic employment in the piracy
industry and enhanced export revenues via pirated goods." Radding, supra note 38, at 7. As
discussed below, many of these problems regarding enforcement still exist today, and, in some
cases, may be at an all-time high. See discussion infra Part 111.
46 See, e.g., Zhou, supra note 9, at 430.
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in 1985. 47 Under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, member
nations must afford protection to the owners of famous marks.4' This
includes a requirement that member nations refuse to register or
cancel the registration and prohibit the use "of a trademark which
constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to
create confusion" with a well-known mark afforded protection under
the Convention.49 As such, all famous marks must be protected under
the Convention in every member-country even if they are not
registered in each country, and any registered marks that conflict with
famous marks must be canceled.5 ° For China, this would mean a big
change in its treatment of trademarks.
As Wang Yan Fsng, an officer of the Intellectual Property Trial
Chamber of the Supreme People's Court of P. R. China,51 has noted,
"in [a] country where the prerequisite for protection is registration,
the protection of the well-known trademark constitutes an exception
to the principle of registration. 5 2 Significantly, however, Article 6bis
does not provide criteria for determining when a trademark is
famous.53 This lack of specificity has provided local AICs, or
Administrations of Industry and Commerce, seeking to protect
registered domestic marks in China some room for interpretation.
Prior to China's adoption of the 2001 trademark law, some courts and
AICs attempted to skirt application of the Convention's requirement
that famous marks be protected by mandating that a mark be well-
known in China before it may be considered a famous mark. 4
Though some unregistered foreign marks won protection during this
47 Birden, supra note 39, at 433-34 n.16 (citing Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 307 [hereinafter Paris Convention]).
48 Paris Convention, supra note 47, at art. 6.
49 Id.
50 Id.
5 This is the only court whose authority is binding on lower courts. China has a civil law
system. See discussion infra Part III.A.
52 Wang Yan Fsng, The Protection of the Well-Known Trademark, JUDICIAL PROTECTION
OF IPR IN CHINA, http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/forum/forum2 I.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2008).
53 Birden, supra note 39, at 452 (noting that although the Paris Convention does not
define what constitutes a well-known mark, Chinese authorities defined well-known marks prior
to the adoption of the 2001 Trademark Law as marks enjoying "(1) a leading market position in
the country of original manufacture; (2) high name-recognition in the international market; and
(3) a certain level of fame in China"). As discussed below, these factors did not often provide
great protection for foreign marks. See infra Part I.C.
4 Cahan, supra note 15, at 229. Requiring that marks attain "a certain level of fame in
China" before they are entitled to receive protection as well-known reflects this desire to avoid
application of Article 6bis for potentially infringing domestic marks, since marks that might be
considered well-known under the Paris Convention might not enjoy the same degree of fame in
China at the time of infringement. See Birden, supra note 39, at 452.
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time, 55 Chinese treatment of foreign well-known marks on the whole
was inconsistent and unpredictable, left mainly to the discretion of
local Chinese courts and AICs, which made such determinations on
an ad-hoc basis.56 As one commentator notes, "obviously, this
lackadaisical approach to international trademark protection did not
pacify the United States and various European nations, and China
received further pressure to amend its practice.
57
In an effort to appease these international concerns, China
amended its trademark law and implementing regulations in 1993.58
However, both the law and the regulations still failed to meet the
criteria international law mandated for the protection of well-known
marks, 59 and various types of infringement remained a rampant
55 For example, in 1987, the Chinese Trademark Office (CTMO) conferred well-known
status on Pizza Hut's mark. See Edward Eugene Lehman et al., Well-Known Trademark
Protection in the People's Republic of China-Evolution of the System, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
257, 259 (2003). In this case, an Australian company attempted to register the trademark "Pizza
Hut" for cake and powder products in China. Id. After learning this, the Pizza Hut Company
objected and asked that the mark be registered in its own name instead. Id The CTMO
determined that the Pizza Hut Company originally created the mark and that its logo should be
given "well-known" status-based in part on the Pizza Hut Company's registration of the mark
in over forty countries, including Australia. Id. As such, the Australian company's application
was denied and the Pizza Hut Company registered its mark in China. Id. Though the CTMO
determined Pizza Hut's mark to be well-known, Pizza Hut received no formal certification of its
mark's new status in China, "which would provide continued protection without the need to
resort to ad hoc means," until two years later. Id.
In another example of the type of ad-hoc, well-known-mark designation Chinese courts
and AICs used prior to China's accession to the WTO, the Intellectual Property Chamber of
Beijing's Second Intermediate People's Court found IKEA to be a well-known mark in 1999.
See Wong, supra note 4, at 957. The court made this determination even though IKEA had not
yet been used in China. Lehman et al., supra note 55, at 261. Though some of the judges in this
case argued that since IKEA had not opened any stores or done any advertising in China, its
mark could not possibly be defined as well known. Id. Clearly, this position was contrary to
China's obligation under the Paris Convention. In the court's final judgment, IKEA's mark was
found to be well-known based on its reputation and the extent of its advertising worldwide. See
Wong, supra note 4, at 957. As one commentator notes, IKEA's well-known mark
"classification was not changed by the fact that at the time of the infringing act, the public in
China did not know the brand name to the same extent as in other countries, or that the
knowledge of the brand name was limited to an urban population of a specific income class."
Lehman et al., supra note 55, at 272. However, the reasoning the IKEA court employed was far
from widely used. See id. at 261. Rather, China's "pre-WTO system" for determining which
marks would be considered well-known was, in fact, quite unsystematic, especially for foreign
brands, which-unlike Chinese trademarks-generally had to show use of their marks both
abroad and in China. Id at 262.
56 See Lehman et al., supra note 55.
57 Cahan, supra note 15, at 229.
58 Nine amendments were made to the 1982 PRC Trademark Law. These amendments
included, inter alia, a provision for the protection of service marks and a provision that made it
a criminal offense to pass off, forge, or copy valid trademarks without authorization, to sell
forged or unauthorized copies, or to knowingly sell goods bearing counterfeit trademarks.
Birden, supra note 39, at 475 (citing Quanguoren da changwei huiguan yu xiugai shangbiaofa
de jueding [Amendment of the Trademark Law Decision] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat'l People's Cong., 1993), translated in CHINA L. & PRAc., Apr. 29, 1993).
59 Wong, supra note 4, at 944.
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problem. In 1988, for example, the International Intellectual Property
Alliance, a U.S. trade organization, determined that American
companies lost at least $415 million in China from the sale of
counterfeit and pirated goods.60 In 1999, that number likely reached
the billions,61 with individual companies like Proctor & Gamble and
Nike estimating total annual losses in China of up to $150 million and
$70 million, respectively.62 In response to China's continuing failure
to address intellectual property abuses, the U.S. Trade Representative
threatened to impose trade sanctions on China in 1991, 1995, and,
again, in 1996, if it did not improve its intellectual-property climate,
particularly with regard to counterfeiting.63
Failure to deal effectively with its counterfeiting problem also
impeded China's admission to the World Trade Organization
(WTO). 64 However, with promises to again reform its intellectual
property laws, China was able to become the 143rd member of the
WTO in 2001.65 Since joining, China has adopted and amended over
140 intellectual property laws in an effort to conform its laws to its
obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), mandated by the WTO.6 6 As
part of this vast overhaul, China amended its trademark law in 2001.67
C. The 2001 Trademark Law Amendments
The 2001 Trademark Law purports to make several improvements
upon China's previous trademark laws. One purported improvement
is the new law's attempt to amend the prior laws' vague definition
and treatment of well-known marks in order to comply with
international intellectual property laws. For instance, before the 2001
Trademark Law redefined well-known marks, the Interim Provisions
60 Birden, supra note 39, at 436.
61 Chow, supra note 11, at 205.
62 Id. at n. 11 (citing David Murphy, Fake Goods at Critical Levels in China, BuS. TIMES,
June 21, 1999, at 5).
63 James J. Holloway, Canadian Anti-Counterfeiting Laws and Practice: A Case for
Change 96 TRADEMARK REP. 724, 731-32 (2006) (continuing that, "[e]ach time the threats were
made, sanctions were averted by China's promise to address the problem. However, the
situation did not appreciably improve.").
64 Id. See also Zhou, supra note 9, at 416 (noting that "China's long-time inability to join
the World Trade Organization... had been largely attributable to political oppositions from the
U.S. and Europe claiming, among other things, that China could not provide adequate protection
for intellectual property rights").
65 Information about China's accession to the WTO can be found on the WTO website.
See World Trade Organization, Member Information: China and the WTO, http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto e/countries e/china e.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2008).
66 Cahan, supra note 15, at 223 (citing Michael E. Burke et al., China Law, 36 INT'L LAW.
815 (2001)).
67 Wong, supra note 4, at 944.
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for the Establishment and Administration of Well-Known Marks,68
which the State AIC issued in 1996, described famous marks as
"registered trademarks which are of high repute and well-known
among the relevant sector of the public., 69 Article 5 of these
Provisions also set rigid requirements and procedures for the
recognition of well-known marks. 70 This definition clearly was at
odds with China's obligation under Article 6bis of the Paris
Conventions, which does not require that marks be registered in order
to receive protection.71 That no foreign marks gained registration
protection under these rules between 1996 and 1999 also speaks to the
Provisions' non-compliance with international intellectual property
commitments.72 By contrast, the 2001 Trademark Law omits the
wholesale registration requirement.73
On paper at least, this change moves China closer in line with its
obligations under the Paris Convention and TRIPS. 74 It also reflects a
desire to quell concern among foreign investors over China's "first-
to-file" system.75 As noted above, absent any leeway under such a
system, the first to file a trademark registration with an AIC in China
is considered definitively to own the mark. Prior to the amendment
removing the requirement that well-known marks be registered, the
"first-to-file" system put many foreign multinational companies at a
great disadvantage in attempting to assert their trademark rights in
China.76 This was, and still is, due to a common practice among
68 This was the first Chinese legal document specifically to protect well-known marks in
China. An Qinghu, Well-Known Marks and China's System of Well-Known Mark Protection, 95
TRADEMARK REP. 705,712 (2005).
69 Provisional Regulations on the Verification and Control of Well-Known Trademarks
(promulgated by the State Admin. for Indus. & Commerce, Aug. 14, 1996), art. 2, translation
available at http://www.wanhuida.com/english-ver/Law/Index.asp?lnfoTypelD=9# (emphasis
added).
70 Wong, supra note 4, at 947.
71 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
1583.
72 Cahan, supra note 15, at 226. During the period these rules were in place, between 1996
and 1999, the SAIC, or State Administration of Industry and Commerce, conferred well-known
status upon eighty-seven marks, but none of these belonged to a foreign company. Id. This may
be due in part to the method of interpretation courts used during this period, which made it
difficult for any marks presented in English to receive protection as well-known, due to the fact
that most of the Chinese public is unable to read English. Id.
73 2001 Trademark Law, supra note 43, art. 13-14.
74 Both agreements require member states to afford protection to well-known marks. See
supra Part II.B. (discussing the requirements of Article 6bis of the Paris Conventions) and infra
Part I.D.2. (discussing the requirements of TRIPS in light of the Toyota case). However, as one
author notes, "there is legitimate concern that these laws and judicial interpretations look good
on paper yet do not make a large difference in trade activities." Cahan, supra note 15, at 223.
75 See id. at 231 (writing that "[tihe Amended Trademark Law is meant to extend well-
known trademark status and its accompanying protection to Chinese and non-Chinese brands
alike as required by international treaties").
76 One example of such difficulty arose for the Walt Disney Corporation when a local
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Chinese infringers of registering famous foreign marks that their true
owners have not yet registered with the local Chinese authorities in
order to capitalize wrongfully on those companies' goodwill. 7
Well-known-mark owners hope that the 2001 law will help
abrogate this practice by affording protection to famous marks in
China, whether or not they have yet been registered; and, in fact, the
2001 Trademark Law includes a provision banning bad-faith
preemptive registration. 78 Under this provision, a well-known-mark
owner may receive protection if the preemptive registration is a
"reproduction, imitation or translation" of the legitimate well-known-
mark owner's unregistered trademark, is for identical or similar goods
or services, and is likely to cause confusion among the consuming
public. 79 Thus, if a mark is found to be well-known, AICs must reject
applications to register marks that conflict with it, and the well-
known-mark owner may move to cancel the registration of any such
marks.
Though the 2001 definition of well-known marks is largely the
same as the previous definition, the 2001 law is somewhat more
illuminating because it includes a set of factors meant to aid in
determining which marks are well known. These factors, included in
Article 14 of the 2001 Trademark Law, are as follows:
(1) reputation of the mark to the relevant public;
(2) time for continued use of the mark;
candy manufacturer in Guangdong registered the marks "Mickey Mouse" and "Donald Duck" in
1994. Stanton J. Lovenworth & Kurt P. Dittrich, Protection of Well Known Trademarks in
China, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 181, 183 (1996) (citing China Patent Agency,
Trademark Fees, CHINA HAND, Jan. 1, 1994). Since Disney had not yet registered its marks in
China, it could not seek administrative or judicial remedies under the first-to-file system in place
at that time. Id. Though Disney eventually prevailed by pressuring Chinese authorities, in turn,
to pressure the candy manufacturer, the local company might well have retained rights in the
two marks under different circumstances, due simply to Disney's failure to register the marks
first in China. Id.
77 See Cahan, supra note 15, at 220 (indicating two reasons to protect famous marks: (1)
because "it allows the owners of famous marks to stop users who desire to capitalize on the
famous mark's name and reputation in a country where the famous product is not yet sold," and
(2) "it aims to prevent trademark piracy in which a pirate registers a famous mark and extorts
the legitimate trademark owner into paying the pirate for the registration").
78 See 2001 Trademark Law, supra note 43, at ch. 1, art. 13 ("Where a trademark in
respect of which the application for registration is filed for use for identical or similar goods is a
reproduction, imitation or translation of another person's trademark not registered in China and
likely to cause confusion, it shall be rejected for registration and prohibited from use.").
79 Id.
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(3)consecutive time, extent and geographical area of
advertisement of the mark;
(4) records of protection of the mark as a well-known mark;
and
(5) any other factors relevant to the reputation of the mark.8°
Additionally, the new Provisions on the Determination and
Protection on Well-Known Trade Marks (2003 Provisions)-which
replaced the 1996 Interim Provisions described above-illustrate the
meaning of these factors in greater detail and describe what types of
documentation a trademark owner may submit to show that its mark
is well known. 8' Despite these refinements, however, there is still
considerable concern about the precise meaning and scope of the
factors listed in the 2001 Trademark Law.
One reason for concern is that the factors do not include specific
definitions for each of their individual terms. Though the 2003
Provisions define a "well-known mark" as one "that is widely known
to the relevant sectors of the public and enjoys a relatively high
reputation in China," they do not define, for example, what
constitutes a "relatively high reputation.', 82 Such lack of specificity
90 Id., art. 14.
81 See Provisions on the Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks
(promulgated by the State Admin. for Indus. & Commerce, Apr. 17, 2003), translation available
at http://sbj.saic.gov.cn/english/show.asp?id=57&bm--flfg. For instance, Article 3 of the 2003
Provisions indicates that the following types of evidence may be used to show that a mark is
well known:
(1) documents concerning the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the
relevant sector of the public;
(2) documents concerning the duration of the use of the mark, including those
related to the history and scope of the use and the registration of the mark;
(3) documents concerning the duration, extent and geographical area of any
promotion of the mark, including the approach to, geographic area of, the type of
media for and the amount of advertisements for the promotion of the mark;
(4) documents concerning the record of successful enforcement of rights in the
mark, including the relevant documents certifying the mark in question was once
protected as a well-known mark in China or any other country/region;
(5) other evidences certifying that the mark is well-known, including, in the past 3
years, the outputs, sales volumes, sales incomes, profits and taxes and sales regions
etc. of the principal goods to which the mark applies.
Id., art. 3.
82 Id., art. 2.
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could create a great deal of room for interpretation. Further, while the
2003 Provisions do define "relevant sector of the public" as including
"consumers of the type of goods and/or services to which the mark
applies,,83 it is unclear what the term "consumers" encompasses. A
court interpreting these definitions may determine that "consumers"
means only actual purchasers, not potential purchasers or consumers
in general. Such an interpretation would erect a huge evidentiary
barrier for foreign well-known-mark holders, especially for those
whose goods have not yet been sold in China or are not available for
practical purposes to the greater Chinese population, due to cost or
other reasons. A second concern with the 2003 Provisions is that
these provisions, like others before them, were implemented more for
the protection of Chinese marks than for foreign marks. If that is the
case, the 2003 Provisions likely will fail to provide owners of famous
foreign marks that have not yet been registered in China with any
added protection.
84
D. Continuing Problems: Local Application of the 2001 Trademark
Law
There is support for concern about the scope of the 2001
Trademark Law in the cases involving Viagra and Toyota detailed
below.
1. The Viagra Case
Viagra's case illustrates a peculiarly Chinese problem that foreign
companies face with regard to their well-known marks-that of
Chinese transliteration, or the practice of changing words written in
Roman text into corresponding Chinese characters. In December
2000, the Beijing Intermediate People's Court No. 2 decided a suit
that Pfizer brought against a Chinese company that registered a
domain name containing the word "Viagra."85 As any junk-email
folder might suggest, "Viagra" is one of the most famous brand
names globally and a huge revenue generator; the product earned an
estimated $1.5 billion in sales worldwide for Pfizer in 2001.86 The
83 Id.
84 Thomas T. Moga & Jonathan Raiti, The TRIPS Agreement and China, 29 CHINA BUS.
REV. 12 (2002), available at 2002 WLNR 5595244.
85 Maria C.H. Lin, China After the WTO: What You Need to Know Now, in 817
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE: COMMERCIAL LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES
179, 187 (2001).
86 David Tuller, Competitors to Viagra Get Ready to Rumble, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002,
at 7.
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court, however, dismissed the case on grounds that only "Wei ge" 87 -
the Chinese transliteration of "Viagra"-is a famous mark in China,
not the word "Viagra" itself.88 Though this ruling was made prior to
China's accession to the WTO (and, accordingly, before its agreement
to TRIPS), it demonstrates both a lack of understanding of Article
6bis of the Paris Convention, which requires that foreign well-known
marks be protected in member countries even if they are not
registered there, and a deeper unwillingness on the part of China to
afford foreign marks protection as "well-known. 89
2. The Toyota Case
(a) A Synopsis of the Toyota Case
Toyota's case not only illustrates the problems of interpretation
surrounding China's 2001 Trademark Law but also indicates potential
inconsistencies within the law itself. Indeed, multinational well-
known-mark holders may be doubly concerned by the No. 5 Civil
Division of the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People's Court's 2003
ruling that Toyota's trademark is not protected in China.90 In the case,
Toyota Motor Corporation accused Zhejinag Geely Automobile
Company of trademark infringement, claiming that the logo on
Geely's economy model, the Merrie, was strikingly similar to
Toyota's.91 Though Toyota has been operating in China only since
1998, it registered its mark there in 1990, and, since 1998, Toyota has
invested at least $1.3 billion in the country.92 It now owns five plants
in China, with a combined total output of 443,000 vehicles annually.93
Moreover, according to Toyota's survey of 317 Chinese consumers,
almost sixty-seven percent believed Geely's Merrie logo was in fact
Toyota's logo; not even seven percent associated the logo with Geely
itself.
94
87 Interestingly, "Wei ge" is a Chinese phrase that literally means "strong brother" in
English. Viagra Proves Effective for Chinese Patients, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Sept. 7, 2000,
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200009/07/eng20000907_49981 .html.
88 Lin, supra note 85, at 187-88.
89 Id. at 188.
90 Liu Li, Logo Likeness Doesn't Hold in Court, CHINA DAILY, June 9, 2004,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doe/2004-09/06/content371807.htm.
91 Id.
92 Chester Dawson, Toyota Roars into China, BUS. WK., Apr. 7, 2003, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/03 14/b3827116_mz033.htm.
93 Toyota Targeting China, India Markets, CHINA DAILY, Nov. 13, 2006,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-11/13/content_731483.htm.
94 Li, supra note 90.
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Despite these facts, the court found there was no infringement.95 It
reasoned that the "[a]utomobile products behind the two logos have
great differences in price and consumers, so buyers will [be] unlikely
[to] believe the logo of Geely's Merrie car is related to Toyota ....
The two brands are different in many aspects, especially in price. ' 96
The court also rejected Toyota's claim that Geely engaged in unfair
competition by using a character of Toyota in its advertisement of
Merrie cars.97 But perhaps most significantly, the court declined to
rule on Toyota's claim that its mark be recognized as well-known in
China.98 It reasoned that, under the 2003 Provisions, trademark
owners may request that their marks be treated as "well-known" only
when there is a special dispute concerning the status of their
trademarks.99 The court decided that Toyota did not need to invoke
this special exception in order to prove its case.100 Though it is
unclear what precisely the court meant here, it is possible that the
court declined to rule on the status of Toyota's mark because Toyota
and Geely produce similar goods, l0 or because Toyota waited nearly
four years to challenge Geely's mark, 0 2 or simply because the court
deemed a well-known-mark determination as irrelevant to its
infringement analysis. 10 3 Whatever the court's reasoning, its ruling
left Toyota's mark unprotected as not-well-known in China.' °4




98 Hong Xue, Between the Hammer and the Block: China's Intellectual Property Rights in
the Network Age, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 291, 308 n.62 (2005).
99 Id.
l00Id.
101 CCPIT Patent and Trademark Law Office, Toyota Lost a Lawsuit Against a Chinese
Car Manufacturer, http://www.ccpit-patent.com.cn/News/2003123006.htm (last visited Feb. 15,
2008).
102 Intellectual Property Protection in China, IPR Disputes in China's Automobile Industry,
(Oct. 23, 2006), http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?a-no=22827&col-no=927&dir=
200610.
103 Id.
104 Cahan, supra note 15, at 222 ("[T]he Beijing Municipal No. 2 Intermediate People's
Court rejected the claim that the trademark Toyota was a well-known trademark in China.").
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TOYOTA,5
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(b) Registration Under the 2001 Trademark Law and TRIPS
Toyota registered its marks in China in 1990, six years before
Geely applied for registration of its mark.1 7 Thus, this ruling
arguably ran contrary to China's own trademark law and to China's
obligation under TRIPS. TRIPS provides protection for both
registered and unregistered famous marks.t t However, under Article
16, owners must register their famous trademarks in order to receive
protection against their unauthorized use on dissimilar goods and
11 Photo courtesy of Brands and Branding: Toyota, http:/iwww.brandsandbranding.co.za/
ViewPublishedBrands.aspx'? BrandI D de89e803-9)e24-4fcd-abSc-97dfabf3Oe6I (last visited
Feb. 15, 2008),
""Photo courtesy of The Trademark Blog: Toyota v. Geely in China and the U.S.,
http://www.schwimmerlegaL.con2OO3 08 toyota_ _geely.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).
11 Intellectual Property Protection in China. yiqwa note 102.
"'See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 16.2 &
16.3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, aiihlable at http:/www wto.org/englishdocse legal
e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS].
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services. 109 This provision also requires that in order for the owner to
obtain protection, the unauthorized use of a registered famous mark
must be likely (1) to suggest a connection between the dissimilar
goods or services and the owner of the famous mark, and (2) to
damage the famous-mark owner. 1° As noted above, China's 2001
Trademark Law likewise provides protection for well-known marks,
whether or not they are registered. 1 ' Also, similarly to TRIPS, the
2001 Trademark Law requires that well-known-mark owners register
their marks in order to receive protection against the unauthorized use
of similar or identical marks by other parties on dissimilar goods or
services. 112 Under both of these laws, registration should provide
more protection-not less-for foreign well-known-mark holders,
since registration affords protection against virtually any unauthorized
use, even on dissimilar goods and services.
(c) Dilution Under the 2001 Trademark Law, TRIPS, and the FTDA
The type of protection both TRIPS and the 2001 Trademark Law
provide is very similar to that afforded well-known marks in the
United States by way of the Federal Trademark Dilution Protection
Act (FTDA)." 3 In a traditional trademark-infringement analysis, a
party may only receive protection for its trademark against another's
use if there is a likelihood of confusion among potential customers
regarding the two uses." 4 When a party unlawfully uses a trademark
on articles that are unlike those produced by the legitimate trademark
owner, confusion is less likely among the purchasing public, since
potential consumers will be less likely to think that the two types of
articles in question came from the same brand owner. 1 5 However,
109Id, art. 16.3.
110 Id.
I See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, THE PROTECTION OF WELL-
KNOWN MARKS IN ASIA-PACIFIC, LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA 12 (2004), available at
http://www.inta.org/membersonly/downloads/ref Asian.pdf.
1 2 See 2001 Trademark Law, supra note 43, art. 14.
"
3SeeLanhamAct § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000).
"14This standard grew out of the common law and is also explicitly adopted for both
registered and unregistered marks in the Lanham Act, the United States' basic trademark statute.
See Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (providing that "any person who shall, without
the consent of the registrant . . . use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a registered mark... in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion . . . shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided"); Lanham Act § 43, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) (providing a similar remedy upon a
determination of likelihood-of-confusion for unregistered marks).
11 See, e.g., Toys "R" Us, Inc., v. Feinberg, 26 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated
on procedural grounds, 201 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding no likelihood of confusion
between the mark "'R' Us," when used on toys and other children's commodities, and "We Are
Guns," when used for a firearms store, particularly in light of the plaintiff's widely publicized
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under the FTDA, marks considered to be famous may receive
protection even when used by other parties on dissimilar goods,
simply because their use by another party dilutes the uniqueness and
fame of the mark." 6 If protection for registered well-known marks
under TRIPS may be likened to that provided for under the FTDA-
and the two are quite similar in substance" 7-then a likelihood of
confusion analysis would be largely irrelevant in deciding whether
well-known marks should be protected. Rather, such marks should be
protected simply because their fame could be diluted through another
party's use, even on dissimilar goods or services." 8
refusal to carry or sell toy guns); Ritz Hotel, Ltd. v. Ritz Closet Seat Corp., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1466
(T.T.A.B. 1990) (holding that consumers were not likely to be confused between the mark,
RITZ, for hotels and the mark, RIT-Z, for toilet seats); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Major Mud &
Chem. Co., 221 U.S.P.Q.2d 1191 (T.T.A.B. 1984) (determining that there was no likelihood of
confusion between "Budweiser" used on beer and "Bitwiser" used for a drilling lubricant); see
also Lacoste Alligator S.A. v. Everlast World's Boxing Headquarters, 204 U.S.P.Q. 945
(T.T.A.B. 1979) (finding no likelihood of confusion between a flying dragon logo when used on
judo uniforms and an alligator logo when used on casual, everyday clothing). But see
McDonald's Corp. v. Druck & Gemer, DDS., P.C., 814 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)
(determining that a balance of the likelihood-of-confusion factors weighed in favor of the owner
of "McDonald's," the familiar mark used for fast-food goods and services, and against the
owner of "McDental," used for dental services).
116 This cause of action was adopted from Professor Schechter's influential law review
article. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813 (1927). Schechter proposed to abandon the consumer confusion model completely,
advocating instead that trademarks be protected from dilution of their uniqueness, as "the
preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark constitute the only rational basis for its
protection." Id. at 831-32. Under this model, any junior use of a similar or identical trademark
that causes destruction of the absolute uniqueness of the senior mark as a product identifier
constitutes dilution-regardless of whether it has any other harmful effect. See id. at 825. This is
because consumer confusion is not the "real injury" caused by the concurrent use of two similar
or identical trademarks, according to Schechter; rather, the true injury is "the gradual whittling
away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use
upon non-competing goods." Id.
117 Compare Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000) with TRIPS, supra note 108,
art. 16.2 & 16.3.
'
18 See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining "dilution" as "the lessening of
the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the
presence or absence of- (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other
parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception") (emphasis added). See also H.R.
REP. No. 104-374, at 2-3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1029-30. According to
the House Judiciary Committee, "[t]he purpose of H.R. 1295 [later enacted as the FTDA] is to
protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or
tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion." Id. at 2, 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1029. Thus, "the use of DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos
would be actionable under this legislation." Id. at 3, 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1030; accord Star
Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 1030, 1033 (D. Haw. 1996) (noting that "[a] mark
must be especially famous and distinctive to merit protection under the [FTDA] because a
violation of the Act triggers extensive relief-preventing all others from using the mark,
regardless of whether the marks are in related fields").
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(d) Did the Toyota Court Confuse a Likelihood of Confusion Analysis
with a Dilution Analysis?
When the Toyota court reasoned that automobile purchasers would
not be confused by similar trademarks between cars, it employed a
likelihood-of-confusion analysis.1" 9 If China's obligation under the
2001 Trademark Law and TRIPS to protect famous registered marks
is analogous to the protection provided famous marks under the
FTDA, then the Chinese court's likelihood-of-confusion analysis was
misguided here since Toyota's mark is famous and registered.
Instead, the court should have protected the Toyota mark simply
because of its global fame and the likelihood that it would be diluted;
any contrary ruling arguably would be a direct violation of TRIPS and
China's own trademark laws.120 Moreover, even if the likelihood-of-
confusion analysis were not out of place, the fact that both Geely and
Toyota produce cars-i.e., very similar goods-and the fact that a
Customer survey revealed that some consumers actually were
confused about the ownership of the two marks suggests that a
likelihood of confusion between the two would be quite high, at least
in the United States. 1
2
'
Of course, China is under no obligation to conform to American
trademark-infringement standards, and the protection that FTDA
affords may not in fact be analogous to that mandated by Chinese law
or TRIPS,- especially considering the fair amount of leeway each
1 9 See discussion supra Part Il.D.2.a. The court reasoned that automobile consumers will
"recognize the difference between the two logos and will not confuse them." Li, supra note 90.
Here, the court was concerned only with whether a customer can "tell" the Geely logo from
Toyota's logo, and not with whether the uniqueness of Toyota's mark would be damaged by
Geely's use of a similar mark. Clearly, this analysis is about customer confusion, not brand
dilution.
'
20See TRIPS, supra note 108, art. 16.2 & 16.3. Toyota would also have to show that
Geely's use would likely damage Toyota. See id.
121 In the United States, actual confusion is the best evidence of a likelihood of confusion.
Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45-46 (5th Cir. 1975). American courts have
considered surveys indicating relatively low levels of customer confusion to be strongly
indicative of actual confusion. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc.,
628 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 1980). In that case, approximately fifteen percent of the individuals
surveyed believed the defendant's sign belonged to Exxon, whereas seven percent were able to
associate the sign with the defendant's corporation. Id. In the Toyota case, moreover, nearly
sixty-seven percent of those surveyed believed the Merrie logo belonged to Toyota and only
about seven percent associated the logo with Geely itself Li, supra note 90. However, where
customer surveys are used to show actual confusion, the evidentiary strength of the survey may
also be at issue. See Exxon, 628 F.2d at 507. Here, the court determined that any survey used to
show actual confusion among consumers should illustrate the beliefs of actual or potential
customers, rather than those of people who may be inexperienced with purchasing automobiles.
Li, supra note 90. Again, however, whether a mark is well-known or not should not depend
upon a likelihood-of-confusion analysis. See discussion supra Part II.D.2(c) If followed by other
Chinese courts, the requirement that survey participants be sophisticated consumers would add
yet another evidentiary burden for foreign well-known-mark-holders.
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member-nation has in formulating its own intellectual-property laws
in accordance with TRIPS. However-given the enormous fame of
Toyota's mark, its striking similarity to Geely's Merrie mark, the
presence of actual confusion among survey participants, and the
similarity of the goods in question-the court's decision seems
unwise, especially if China is serious about conveying a favorable
impression to multinational investors.
(e) The Toyota Case and Potential Inconsistencies in the 2001
Trademark Law
This case also demonstrates potential inconsistencies in China's
2001 Trademark Law. Under the Toyota court's ruling, to be
recognized by a Chinese court, foreign well-known mark holders
must prove not only that their marks are famous, but also that
competing marks will be likely to cause confusion among the public
with their well-known marks. 122 If other courts follow this ruling, then
it may prove extremely difficult for even registered mark-holders to
receive protection against the use of their marks-at least on
dissimilar goods-since such uses rarely will be likely to cause
confusion among potential consumers. Particularly troubling,
moreover, is the possibility that the Toyota court refused to rule on
Toyota's well-known-mark status because it believed it unnecessary
to do so when the types of goods in question are similar. 123 If this
were the court's reasoning, other courts following the Toyota ruling
may never grant well-known status to famous foreign marks, at least
in cases where the goods in question are similar or identical. Rather,
such courts could simply dismiss such claims as irrelevant without
further discussion. Ironically, it is these uses-unauthorized uses of
well-known marks on similar goods-against which foreign well-
known-mark-holders generally require the most protection, since they
include the most egregious trademark-usurping practices such as
counterfeiting.
In any case, the Toyota court's vague reasoning and quick
dismissal of Toyota's claim that its mark is well-known in China
provide useful precedent for any Chinese court wanting to withhold
well-known status from foreign mark-holders. For the time being, it
seems that inconsistency and unpredictability abound for foreign
well-known-mark-owners in Chinese courts; only time will tell how
much weight the Toyota decision will carry and what level of
M See 2001 Trademark Law, supra note 43.
123 See CCPIT Patent & Trademark Law Office, supra note 101.
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protection foreign mark-holders can expect to receive from the
various arms of the Chinese government in the future.
II. THE STARBUCKS DECISION
A. A Brief Description of the Case
Like many foreign multinational companies dazzled by the
potential for great fortune in China, Starbucks sought to enter the
Chinese market in the late 1990s. Starbucks first introduced its chain
in Taiwan in 1998 and thereafter licensed a Taiwanese company to
begin operating its coffee business in China.124 Together with its
licensed Taiwanese company, the President Group, Starbucks opened
coffeehouses in Taiwan and Hong Kong, registering "Xingbake" as
its name in both of those locations. 125 "Xingbake" is the Chinese
pinyin version of the word "Starbucks"-"xing" means "star" in
Chinese, and the two Chinese syllables "ba" and "ke" together sound
like "bucks."'
126
Starbucks first registered its trademark in mainland China in
December 1999,127 and the first Chinese Starbucks opened that year in
Beijing. 128 After establishing the joint venture, named Shanghai
President Starbucks Shareholding Company, in May 2000 for
purposes of expanding into Shanghai, Starbucks and the President
Group learned that Shanghai Xingbake had pre-registered the name
"Xingbake" in October 1999 and had opened in Shanghai in March
2000. 129
124 Wong, supra note 4, at 953.
125 d
126Starbucks Sues over Trademark Infringement, CHINA DAILY, Feb. 6, 2004,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-02/1 6/content_306335. In addition to
registering their original trademarks, many foreign trademark-owners choose to register Chinese
characters to better "identify their products and services to Chinese consumers." Samir B.
Dahman, Note, Protecting Your IP Rights in China: An Overview of the Process, 1
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 63, 73 (2006). This practice "removes a language barrier,
improves recognition of a trademark and enables the products to reach a wider
market .... Otherwise, if a foreign product is sold without a Chinese trademark, Chinese
consumers will adopt their own name for the product." Id. Foreign trademark-owners can
translate their Roman-character trademarks into Chinese characters either by (1) translating
literally the Roman-character trademark's concept, or by (2) translating the Roman-character
trademark's phonetic sound. Id.
27 Jing Li & Shaobin Zu, Starbucks Corporation Wins in a Trademark Infringement and
Unfair Competition Case in Shanghai, China, 14 C.A.S.R.I.P. NEWSL. 2, Spring 2007,
http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/NewsletterVoll14/newsvl4i2LiandZhu.
128Lu Haoting, Starbucks Still Brewing up a Storm, CHNA DAILY, June 13, 2006,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2006-06/13/content_616003.htm.
1291d; see also Li & Zu, supra note 127.
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Fearing that Shanghai Xingbake's use of "Xingbake" would cause
customer confusion and allow the small Shanghai Company to profit
unfairly from its goodwill, Starbucks attempted to stop Shanghai
Xingbake from using the name. 30 After first attempting to settle the
matter, Starbucks brought an administrative action through the
Shanghai AIC, the local branch of China's greater administrative
trademark authority. 131 Though the Shanghai AIC ordered Shanghai
Xingbake to stop using any identifying marks similar to those of
Starbucks, the Shanghai company refused, responding instead in
September 2003 by opening another branch of its local chain in a
high-profile location.
132
In December 2003, Starbucks filed suit in the Shanghai No. 2
Intermediate People's Court against Shanghai Xingbake alleging
trademark infringement and unfair competition. 133 Under China's
2001 Trademark Law, unlawful use of a mark that is phonetically
similar to the trademark owner's mark on similar goods constitutes
grounds for a trademark infringement claim.134 In this case, the parties
were both coffeehouses and shared the mark "Xingbake" in China.
3 5
The two companies also had similar logos. Thus, Starbucks' claim
against Shanghai Xingbake was clearly within the scope of the new
law.
Starbucks argued that because of the similarity of the two names
and logos, not only was the probability of customer confusion high,
136
but also the circumstances pointed to a finding of bad faith on the part
of the Shanghai company.137 Starbucks also emphasized the fact that
"big brand owners like Starbucks have invested heavily into building
their brands .... In this case the integrity of the brand is at stake."
38
For various reasons, Shanghai Xingbake's manager did not believe
the company had infringed Starbucks' trademark. 139 He argued that,
1
30 Starbucks Sues over Trademark Infringement, supra note 126.
13
1 Toh Han Shih, Starbucks Sues in Shanghai Cafg Sign Spat, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Jan. 31, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR 6018187.
132 Id. Indeed, before the decision granting Starbucks trademark rights, Shanghai Xingbake
planned to open between thirty and fifty new franchise locations in Shanghai. Wong, supra note
4, at 955 n. 136. Interestingly, Shanghai Xingbake's reaction to the Shanghai AIC's order also
clearly demonstrates the Chinese trademark administration's total lack of authority or effective
ability to curb Chinese companies' efforts to capitalize unfairly on the goodwill of famous
foreign marks. See discussion infra, Part III.B.
133 Starbucks Sues over Trademark Infringement, supra note 126.
134 Wong, supra note 4, at 953.
135 Starbucks Sues over Trademark Infringement, supra note 126.
136 Shih, supra note 131.
137 China Industry: Coffeecat, ECONOMIST INTEL. UNIT, VIEWSWIRE CHINA, Mar. 17,
2004, available at 2004 WLNR 13988794.
138 Shih, supra note 131.
139Starbucks Sues over Trademark Infringement, supra note 126.
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since he was first to register the name, "Xingbake"-he did so in
October 1999, two months before Starbucks registered its trademark
in mainland China 4 0 -his company was the rightful owner and that,
in any case, he had not used "Xingbake" as a trademark but only as a
"legitimate company title."'' 41  He also argued that Shanghai
Xingbake's green and white logo was designed by one of his staff
members and that any similarity between his company's and
Starbucks' logos was mere coincidence, since he had not heard of
Starbucks until it began warning his company not to use its marks.
42
Here are the two logos for comparison:
II
143 144
140 Li & Zu, supra note 127.
141 Wong, supra note 4, at 954. This argument is based on a Chinese law under which
trademark registrations and enterprise-name registrations are treated separately. Id at 954 n. 140
(citing Interview by Emma Barraclough with An Qinghu, Director General, China Trademark
Office, Inside World's Busiest Trade Mark Registry: Trademark Applications in China have
Risen by 80,000 in Each o] the Past Two Years and the Rapid Growth Looks Set to Continue,
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Nov. 1, 2004, at 25). See also China Industry: Coffeecat, supra note
137. Enterprise names are registered with the local AICs. Wong, supra note 4, at 954 n.140.
Thus, in this case, Shanghai Xingbake registered its "enterprise name" with the Shanghai AIC.
By contrast, trademarks are registered with the CTMO. Id. Though, typically, there is no
conflict between trademarks and enterprise names, conflict may arise in the context of well-
known trademarks and enterprise names-as it did in this case between Starbucks and Shanghai
Xingbake. Starbucks argued that, in this situation under Chinese Law, a trademark is more
important than an enterprise name. China Industry: Coffeecat, supra note 137.
142 Thomas Moore, Landmark Judgment in Chinese IPR Case, EAST MIDLANDS-CHINA
Bus. BUREAU, http://www.eastmids-china.co.uk/starucksvxingbake.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2008). Apparently, Shanghai Xingbake also claimed that the word "Xingbake" was its own
invention, inspired by the character, Simba, from Disney's The Lion King. Gordon Fairclough,
From Hongda to Wumart, Brand Names In China Have Familiar, if Off-Key, Ring, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 19, 2006, at B1.
"I Jefferson Graham, Starbucks to Put Digital Music on Its Menus, USA TODAY, Mar. 15,
2004, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-03-15-starbucks x.htm (Photo by Justin
Sullivan).
144 Photo courtesy of Fontblog, Starbucks Gewinnt Logo-Streit in China,
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The court rejected the arguments of Shanghai Xingbake's manager
and held, in December 2005, that Shanghai Xingbake had engaged in
unfair competition and trademark infringement by operating under the
phonetic equivalent of "Starbucks" in Chinese and by using a similar
logo. 45 Though Shanghai Xingbake technically pre-registered its
enterprise name before Starbucks registered its trademark-October
1999 for Shanghai Xingbake versus December 1999 for Starbucks-
the trial court found that Starbucks acquired exclusive rights to its
trademark at the date of registration, whereas preregistration would
not afford Shanghai Xingbake such rights until the date of its formal
establishment.146 More importantly, the trial court found that
Shanghai Xingbake had maliciously used "Xingbake"-Starbuck's
well-known mark-in registering its enterprise name. 147 According to
the court, both "Starbucks" and "Xingbake" had been widely
publicized in China before Shanghai Xingbake registered its name.48
Thus, Shanghai Xingbake either knew or should have known that
these two marks were famous in the coffee industry and that it
violated Starbucks' well-known marks by pre-registering the name
"Xingbake."'
149
As part of its ruling, the trial court ordered Shanghai Xingbake to
stop using the name and to pay Starbucks the maximum penalty under
trademark law, 500,000 yuan, or, roughly, $62,500.'50 The trial court
further required Shanghai Xingbake to issue an apology to Starbucks
in a local newspaper.' 5' While the case was pending, the court also
froze Shanghai Xingbake's bank account and seized from it items
related to the proceedings, such as name cards and menus.1
52
Following the trial court's judgment, Shanghai Xingbake appealed
the decision to the Shanghai Higher People's Court. 53 Shanghai
Xingbake advanced several arguments on appeal, including the
following: (1) the trial court's finding that "Xingbake" is well-known
in China was clearly erroneous, (2) Shanghai Xingbake validly
http://www.fontshop.de/newsfeed/C130786794/E316938656/index.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2008).
145 Ping, supra note 3.
146 Li & Zu, supra note 127. The Implementing Measures for Administration of Enterprise
Name Registration of the People's Republic of China provide that a pre-registrant owns its





IS0 Ping, supra note 3.
1 Li & Zu, supra note 127.
152 Shih, supra note 131.
'53 Li & Zu, supra note 127.
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acquired exclusive rights to use "Xingbake" as a result of its pre-
registration of the enterprise name, and (3) the trial court's finding
that Shanghai Xingbake maliciously infringed Starbucks' trademarks
lacked supporting evidence. 54 The appellate court rejected all of
Shanghai Xingbake's arguments and upheld all of the trial court's
rulings, including the trial court's award of 500,000 yuan to Starbucks
and the requirement that Shanghai Xingbake stop using the name
"Xingbake." 1
55
B. One Small Step for Well-Known-Mark-Holders; One Giant Leap
for Starbucks
Commentators have cited the Starbucks case as a significant
victory in China for owners of well-known marks not only because it
illustrates China's willingness to protect such marks, but also because
the case "provides some guidance as to what constitutes a well-known
mark" in China.1 56 By further developing the law in this area, rulings
such as this one may help pave the way for other multinational
companies seeking to protect their marks in China in the future.
In addition, the case was the first to be decided under the 2001
Trademark Law's provision for well-known marks.157 As noted
earlier, part of the purported function of this new law is to give well-
known-mark-holders special protection for their famous marks. 158 The
2001 Trademark Law's provision excepting well-known marks from
registration is extremely important to multinational companies
wanting to invest in China because trademark protection in China is
still based on a "first-to-file" system. 159 Under this largely
straightforward regime, the first to register its trademark in China is
considered to be the trademark's rightful owner, regardless of use. In
this case, however, the court granted trademark protection to
Starbucks in spite of the fact that it technically had not registered its
mark in China before Shanghai Xingbake.160 The trial court so held
based largely on findings that Starbucks' marks are well-known in
China due "to their widespread use, publicity and reputation."' ' 6 1
According to the court, Starbucks has invested a great deal of money
14Id.
1551d. The Shanghai Higher People's Court made its ruling December 20, 2006; it is the
final decision in this case Id.
156 Wong, supra note 4, at 956-57.
157 Starbucks Wins Trademark Dispute, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 2, 2006, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/02/business/web.0 102starbucks.php.158 See 2001 Trademark Law, supra note 43.
159 See id.
16 Ping, supra note 3.
161 Id.
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promoting and using its marks worldwide-including "Xingbake" in
Chinese-speaking regions. 162 As a result, not only have Starbucks'
trademarks achieved fame on the international scale, but they have
also become well-known in China, particularly.
163
Whether or not the case proves to be a victory for other famous
mark-holders, the case was undoubtedly a great success for
Starbucks, 164 whose global-expansion plans center on investing
selectively in countries where it feels it could eventually dominate the
market. 165 The company views winning the domination of Shanghai's
coffee market as particularly key in this quest.' 66 Had the decision
been unfavorable to Starbucks, the company's incentive to invest
heavily in China might have been reduced substantially. 67 Now,
however, Starbucks may continue to pour money into its expansion
efforts in China without fear that another company will trade unfairly
on the goodwill it has sought to develop on an international scale.'
68
To date, Starbucks' investment efforts have resulted in its opening
165 stores in China, and its stock prices continue to climb.
69
Although sales in China accounted for less than ten percent of
Starbucks total worldwide sales of $6.4 billion in 2006, Starbucks'
Chairman Howard Schultz believes China will soon become the
company's largest market outside North America. 170 According to
China Daily, "Starbucks has become one of the most popular brands
162 Li & Zu, supra note 127.
163 Id
164 Wong, supra note 4, at 958 (touting the Starbucks decision as an "important victory for
[both] Starbucks and China").
165 See id. at 958 (explaining that "Starbucks has decided to focus its efforts on a few
countries where it sees great potential," as opposed to entering many new countries at once). In
addition to China, Starbucks considers Russia, Brazil, and India to be good markets for potential
expansion. Id. at 958 n. 172. See also Keith Bradsher, Starbucks Aims to Alter China's Taste in
Caffeine, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2005, at C3 (noting that Starbucks' long-term goal is to have
thirty-thousand stores worldwide, with fifteen-thousand of them outside the United States and a
large fraction of them in China).
166 Legal Battle Brews Between Starbucks and Chinese Coffee Shop, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Aug. 6, 2003, http://quickstart.clari.net/qsse/webnews/wed/dp/Qchina-us-company.
R Z Da6.html.
167 See Wong, supra note 4, at 958 (noting that "if Starbucks had received an unfavorable
decision, Starbucks might have scaled back their [sic] plans for expansion in the country").
168 See id.
169TDCTrade.com, China Industry News, Starbucks Sees Robust Growth, Focuses on
China, Feb. 15, 2006, http://my.tdctrade.com/aimewse/index.asp?id=15756&wsid=99&w_pid
=196&wnid=1757&w cid=540144&widt=2006-02-21. Starbucks reported that its earnings
rose over twenty percent to 174.2 million U.S. dollars in early 2006, effectively sending its
share price to a record high of $35.50 per share. Id. Starbucks further claimed it could deliver
annual earnings growth of at least twenty percent over the next three to five years, "as China
becomes a focus for its global strategy." Id.
170 China Central to Starbucks Growth, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/
4712012.stm (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
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among Chinese white collar workers."' 71  Such rapid progress
unquestionably is impressive for a country "steeped in 5,000 years of
tea." 172 Even Chinese President Hu was recently photographed with
Seattle politicians after a day of meeting Starbucks and Microsoft
executives, each with a logo-emblazoned mug in hand, perhaps
toasting an for lobal domination. 173
~174
III. LIMITATIONS TO THE STARBUCKS DECISION
A. No Binding Authority, Toyota's Legacy
One potential limitation on the future importance of the Starbucks
decision is the fact that China has a civil law system, under which
there is no principle of stare decisis. In civil law countries, prior court
decisions may be persuasive authority, but they do not have binding
effect either on the same court that issued them or on other courts. 75
Thus, Chinese courts need not follow the Starbucks decision at all
71 Haoting, supra note 128.
172 Fowler, supra note 21. Of course, Starbucks offers several varieties of tea, in addition to
its menu of coffee beverages. But "[w]hat is striking about these efforts, by [multinational
enterprises including] Starbucks, is that they have made few concessions to Chinese tastes,
instead cultivating in China an appetite for Western favorites, like Big Macs and grand6 lattrs."
See Bradsher, supra note 165. Indeed, "[t]he company s market research has found that
customers in China tend to come in initially just to find a place to meet, and then begin buying
coffee as they become repeat customers." Id.
173 Hu Tastes Starbucks Coffee, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.chinadaily.com.
cn/china/2006-04/20/content_572181.htm (President Hu is pictured with Christine Gregoire,
governor of Washington, and Gary Locke, former Washington governor).
174 Id (Photo courtesy of CHINA DAILY).
17 See, e.g., Michele Lee, Note, Franchising in China: Legal Challenges when First
Entering the Chinese Market, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 949, 985-86 (2004) (discussing the
ability of intellectual-property court decisions to shape later decisions).
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should they want to withhold from foreign companies protection for
their well-known marks.
Other Chinese courts also could easily distinguish the Starbucks
case on its facts. Prior to suing Shanghai Xingbake, Starbucks
brought an administrative action through the Shanghai AIC to protect
its trademarks. 176 In response, the Shanghai AIC ordered Shanghai
Xingbake to remove all signs, names and logos similar to Starbucks
from its premises. 177 However, Shanghai Xingbake failed to obey the
AIC's order, opting instead to violate it flagrantly by opening yet
another outlet on its city's chic Nanjing Road. 178 Subsequent Chinese
courts could argue that the Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People's
Court in this case "granted" trademark rights to Starbucks merely to
enforce the existing order issued earlier by the Shanghai AIC-not
based on any independent determination that Starbucks' marks are
well known. Moreover, even if other Chinese courts determine that
the Starbucks court's well-known-mark discussion was essential to its
holding, they easily could decline to make their own well-known-
mark determinations in the future-especially by pointing to the
highly publicized Toyota case. As noted earlier, the court in that case
refused to rule on Toyota's well-known-mark status based on its
assertion that such a ruling was unnecessary to the disposition of the
case. 179 Chinese courts making determinations such as these likely
would do so in violation of TRIPS and the 2001 Trademark Law. 180
Despite this, many courts may be inclined to rule against foreign
well-known-mark-holders for any of the reasons described below.
B. The Many Problems of Enforcement Against Counterfeiting in
China
Though China has now brought the text of its trademark laws
closely in line with its international obligations, China's overall
enforcement of these laws is still sorely lacking. 18 One reason for this
derives from China's widespread problem of counterfeiting. The
incentive to counterfeit exists in every nation, since copying allows
counterfeiters to trade on the goodwill a senior mark has established
176 Wong, supra note 4, at 954.
177 Shih, supra note 131.
178 Id.
79 Xue, supra note 98, at 308 n.62.
1 0 See TRIPS, supra note 108, at arts. 16.2-16.3 (detailing rights conferred on trademark-
holders); 2001 Trademark Law, supra note 43, art. 13 (providing that trademark applications for
goods will be rejected if the marks are identical, similar, likely to mislead the public, or
prejudice interests of another trademark or well-known-mark registrant).
Is' Chow, supra note 11, at 211-12 (comparing incentives to copy in the United States and
China).
910 [Vol. 58:3
2008] THE STARBUCKS DECISION
without having to incur any of the costs associated with product
development and brand identity build-up. 82 Countries like the United
States offset these benefits through the imposition of substantial
penalties such as large civil damages awards.' 83 In China, however,
there are no serious costs associated with unauthorized copying or
commercial piracy. 184
1. The Impotence of Enforcement Measures
Though, in recent years, China has increased dramatically its use
of enforcement tactics such as seizures and raids, the effectiveness of
such measures has been minimal. 85 Indeed, such measures often
appear to be merely for show.' 86 Though AICs frequently impose
fines upon the counterfeiters they catch in raids, those fines tend to be
very small. For instance, the average fine counterfeiters paid in 2000
was $794, and the average award to brand owners that year was a
mere $19.'87 According to a study conducted recently by the Motion
Picture Association (MPA) on the raids and seizures that Chinese
authorities have executed pursuant to the MPA's complaints, the
average fine imposed per counterfeit unit seized was only slightly
higher than the cost of a blank disc. 88 Low fines like these cannot act
as serious deterrents, 189 especially considering the high rates of return
1821d. at 210-12.
83Id. at 212 n.47.
184See Jayanthi Iyengar, Intellectual Property Piracy Rocks China Boat, ASIA TIMES
ONLINE, Sept. 16, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FI16Ad07.html. William H.
Lash, III, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Market Access and Compliance, gave three
basic reasons for the abundance of commercial piracy in China: (1) a weak legal framework for
the protection of intellectual property, (2) high rates of retun for those who engage in
infringement, and (3) insubstantial penalties for violations. Id. Emphasizing the relationship
between points (2) and (3), Lash stated that since an investment of as little as one thousand
dollars in counterfeit pharmaceuticals could yield five hundred thousand dollars in profits, the
risk and magnitude of punishment must be substantially steeper in order to curb counterfeiters.
Id. He continued, "[i]f you're facing a 5,000% return on your investment and no chance of being
caught, and even in the unlikely chance that you're caught, you go home the same day-that
fuels piracy." Id.
185 Id.
186 The exaggerated nature of some enforcement measures illustrates this point. For
instance, in 2004, China launched an annual "IPR Protection Week," complete with billboards
encouraging people to "Sternly Beat Down Counterfeits." Forney, supra note 1. During this
time, a prime-time television broadcast featured steamrollers crushing thousands of CDs and
DVDs that authorities had confiscated. Id. Perhaps this was an attempt to carry out literally the
urgings of IPR Protection Week's billboards.
187 Chow, supra note 11, at 212.
188 Piracy of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property
of the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Eric Smith, President, International
Intellectual Property Alliance), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=l 514&
wit id=4301.
189 Id.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:3
counterfeiters typically enjoy.' 90 Furthermore, while the 2001
Trademark Law allows for cases to be sent to the national judicial
authorities for criminal prosecution, just between two and two-and-
one-half percent of all cases are prosecuted.' 9' Criminal convictions
are likely to be even rarer.' 92 Most counterfeiters view these weak
enforcement procedures as simply a cost of doing business.' 93 As
Professor Daniel C.K. Chow of the Ohio State University notes, "[i]t
is no exaggeration to say that many in China believe that they can
engage in the theft of intellectual property with impunity or at least
escape without any serious adverse consequences. This creates a
190 See lyengar, supra note 184.
191 Hearing on Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods Before
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2006) (statement of Andrew C.
Mertha, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Washington University in St.
Louis), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/transcripts/june7_8/mertha_
footnote.pdf [hereinafter Mertha Testimony]. It is important to note the rate of improvement in
this area. Though this number is quite small, it "represent[s] a five to ten-fold increase in five
years." Id. In 2000, for instance, just forty-five out of the 22,001 total cases were referred to the
Public Security Bureau for criminal prosecution. Chow, supra note 11, at 213 n.53. Apparently,
up to ninety percent of these cases could have been prosecuted in a criminal court but were
handled administratively instead. Mertha Testimony, supra.
192 See Cahan, supra note 15, at 248 (noting the infrequency of criminal sanctions); see
also OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, SPECIAL 301 REPORT SECTION
306: CHINA (2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/ReportsPublications/
2003/2003 Special_301 Report/Special 301 ReportSection_306.html?ht= (stating that
"China remains one of the last countries in the world that fails to use... its criminal law to go
after ...trademark counterfeiters" and recommending that China remedy this problem by
"ensur[ing] that China's officials take a serious and consistent approach to sentencing [and by]
reduc[ing] the high thresholds for criminal prosecutions that, in practice, prevent effective
application of China's criminal law to IPR violators"); accord Chow, supra note 11, at 212-213
n.53 (observing that, while there are no exact statistics available on how many of the few cases
referred for criminal prosecution result in convictions or on how many convicted defendants end
up serving time in prison, criminal defendants in some cases may avoid the possibility of prison
altogether by paying off enforcement officials).
However, it should be noted that some have been penalized under the criminal law-and
severely. Deming Luo, who counterfeited a well-known Chinese alcohol brand and obtained
approximately two million Renminbi in profits from it, was found guilty and executed pursuant
to a court-made rule mandating the death penalty for trademark-infringers who make
"exceptional" profits from their exploits. Cahan, supra note 15, at 248 n. 189 (citation omitted).
However, the trademark infringement at issue in that case involved a Chinese brand, and, as
noted above, the Chinese government historically has favored domestic marks over those
belonging to foreign companies. Id at 231-32. Criminal sanctions for trademark violations no
longer include the death penalty. See, e.g., Omario Kanji, Note, Paper Dragon: Inadequate
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in China, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1261, 1273 (2006).
Under Article 213 of the current Chinese criminal law, prison sentences not exceeding three
years may be imposed for trademark-counterfeiting involving "serious circumstances." Id. A
prison term of three to seven years may be imposed for crimes of "especially/extremely severe
circumstances." Id. Under Article 214, the sale of counterfeit trademarks may invite a maximum
of up to three years in prison for "relatively large sales." Id. "Huge sales" will bring a violator
three to seven years in prison under this provision. Id.
193 Chow, supra note 11, at 213.
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widespread business culture that tolerates, or even encourages,
unauthorized copying."'
' 94
2. How Greater China Benefits from Counterfeiting
China also substantially benefits from counterfeiting. There are
several reasons for this, one of which stems from the fact that many
counterfeiters find great incentive in exporting their goods. 95 Though
the penalties associated with raids and seizures are mild, a
counterfeiter seeking to avoid them entirely stands a better chance of
doing so if he sends his goods overseas.1 96 Counterfeit goods, once
exported, travel all over the globe, sometimes through the added
intermediary of a freight forwarder or a transportation and
warehousing company.' 97 This makes it difficult to trace the goods
back to their infringing originators. Further, China greatly encourages
exportation. Exports in general account for a substantial portion of
China's gross domestic product-approximately forty percent.
198
China has depended upon the growth of its export market to drive the
modernization of its economy and to improve domestic standards of
living. 99 Exports also tend to bring in strong foreign currency and
contribute to a more favorable trade balance for China.200 Because of
this, customs officers may be less willing to put effort into searching
for counterfeit goods headed for export than they might be with
regard to goods imported into China.20 There is evidence for this in
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's estimate that
counterfeits from China accounted for almost seventy percent of all
infringing product seized at the U.S. border in 2005.202 China's share
of items seized at the U.S. border is "ten times greater than that of any






198 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS: ENTERING
A NEW PHASE OF GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT: TOP-TO-BOTrOM REVIEW 3
(2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Reports Publications/2006/
assetuploadfile921_8938.pdf.
1991d.
200 Chow, supra note 11, at 214.
201 Id.
202 US. Chamber of Commerce Views on China's Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights and the Dangers of the Movement of Counterfeited and Pirated Goods into the United
States: Hearing Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 109th
Cong. (2006) (statement of Myron Brilliant, Vice President, East Asia, United States Chamber
of Commerce), available at http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/written-testimonies/
06_06 07wrts/06 067 8 brilliant myron.pdf[hereinafter Brilliant Testimony].
203 Id.
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In 2004, China enacted a law designed specifically to combat the
problem of counterfeit exports-the Regulation of the People's
Republic of China on Customs Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights.2 °4 Under this law, trademark owners can have Chinese
Customs Officials detain goods at points of entry into and exit out of
China for inspection and a determination on whether the detained
goods violate Chinese Law.2 °5 However, not only must trademark
owners cut through a fair amount of administrative red tape in order
to take advantage of these procedures, but also Chinese customs
officers must be educated adequately about what they looking for in
order for the law to be effective.206 Due to the large amount and
highly specific nature of the information trademark owners must
convey to customs officers before they may take action upon
potentially infringing goods, Chinese Customs' capability of seizing
large amounts of infringing goods might be greatly inhibited.20 7 These
factors could likely have a substantial stifling effect on the new law's
effectiveness. Furthermore, the fact that the percentage of infringing
product from China seized at the U.S. border actually increased from
2004 to 2005 may be evidence of problems with the new Customs
law. 2
08
3. How Counterfeiters Benefit: China's Lack of Political Will to
Crack Down
There are also problems with China's political incentive to limit
counterfeiting, since local economies are often dependent upon
selling or manufacturing counterfeits. One prime example of this
phenomenon is the city of Yiwu. Yiwu, once a small, impoverished
farming community near Shanghai, is now a city of nearly 650,000
and home to a large wholesaling entity, the Zhejiang China Small
Commodities City Group (ZCSCC),20 9 touted as the "biggest small
commodities export[er]" in the world.210 According to Yiwu's
website, the twenty markets that make up the city's larger ZCSCC
204 Cahan, supra note 15, at 247.
205 Regulation on Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (effective July 1,




206 Cahan, supra note 15, at 247.
207 Id.
20 8 Brilliant Testimony, supra note 202, at 3.
209 Chow, supra note 11, at 218.




cover over one million square meters and house over 320,000
varieties of goods.2 11 Over two hundred-thousand people from all
over the world visit Yiwu's markets212 and leave with over one
thousand "containers" each day.21 3 The ZCSCC is also the largest
employer in the area, accounts for over a quarter of the tax revenues
generated from the municipality, and supports many other
surrounding legitimate businesses. It has been estimated that Yiwu's
total annual gross income has reached over three billion dollars per
year-equaling, if not surpassing, the total yearly earnings of many
multinational corporations.21 4 Significantly, many of Yiwu's visitors
are foreign business people who order products to be exported
overseas.215 Since about ninety percent of the goods Yiwu's markets
purvey are infringing or counterfeits, 21 6 these facts illustrate Yiwu's
contribution not only to the problem of counterfeit goods within the
Chinese market, but also to that of exportation of such goods abroad.
Nevertheless, Yiwu's complete turnaround, from poor fanning
village to bustling city with a rapidly expanding economy, over the
last twenty-five years, has earned the city national renown and the
envy of many other small, struggling Chinese communities wishing to
emulate Yiwu's success.217 When millions of Chinese citizens depend
for their livelihood on counterfeiting practices, China has limited
incentive to really crack down. And in a country where many rural
people still distrust foreigners,218 there can be no serious contest for
2 11Id.
212 Chow, supra note 11, at 218.
213The Main Markets of Yiwu, supra note 210. This figure may be somewhat
questionable, since it comes from Yiwu's own website. It is also somewhat unclear what is
meant by the word "containers." Other commentators have put this figure at "approximately
2,000 tons of goods each day." Liu, supra note 18, at 1154; accord Bargain Shop to the World
Feels Price-War Heat, THE STANDARD, Nov. 28, 2005, http://www.thestandard.com.hk/
news detail.asp?wecat - 14&artid=653 I&sid=5631619&con_type= I &d str=-20051128
("Yiwu is the place to come if you need 20,000 electric razors for HK$26.74 apiece, 30,000
clocks at HK$4 each or maybe 50,000 blow-up Santa Clauses."). A U.S. dollar exchanges at a
rate about eight times that of the Hong Kong dollar. See X-Rates.com, Currency Calculator,
http://www.x-rates.com/calculator.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2008).
2 14 See Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People's Republic of China, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 20 (2000).
215 Chow, supra note 11, at 219; see also Shao Xiayi & Ren Kan, Yiwu Enjoys Golden
Prospects, CHINA DAILY, Oct. 19, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-
10/19/content 383674.htm (noting that over five thousand foreign merchants live in Yiwu full-
time, that thousands more travel to Yiwu every year on buying trips, and that most of Yiwu's
local traders maintain relationships with traders overseas, selling products to nearly two hundred
countries and regions worldwide).
216 Chow, supra note 11, at 219.
2 17 Liu, supra note 18, at 1161-62; see also Chow, supra note 11, at 218 (noting that the
ZCSCC "grew at a rate of about 4,700% from its establishment in 1982 to 1996").
218 See, e.g., Stacey H. Wang, Note, Great Olympics, New China: Intellectual Property
Enforcement Steps up to the Mark, 71 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 303 (2005)
(explaining that China's failure to implement a truly effective intellectual-property-enforcement
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local authorities attempting to balance the rights of foreign trademark
owners against tremendous local prosperity and the admiration of all
of China.
4. Government Involvement in Counterfeiting
Furthermore, protectionism of counterfeiters often extends beyond
a mere balance of foreign and domestic interests, since many local
Chinese administrative agencies themselves contribute to or even
create the problem of counterfeiting. 219 The ZCSCC in Yiwu, for
example, began when the Yiwu government decided to invest ten
million dollars in 1982 in a wholesaling entity dedicated to the sale of
small commodities such as toiletries and handbags.220 Though the
ZCSCC underwent privatization in 1993, it still retains ties to the
local government. 22  Not only is a large portion of the senior
management of the ZCSCC made up of current or former government
regime has stemmed, in part, from its "deep distrust of foreigners").219 Liu, supra note 18, at 1181-83.
220 Chow, supra note 11, at 218. Apparently, Yiwu also owes part of its success to a local
man, Xie Gaohua, who was the town's Communist Party Secretary during the Chinese Cultural
Revolution. Bargain Shop to the World Feels Price- War Heat, supra note 213. The Standard
describes Yiwu's humble beginnings:
At the time, there was nothing more glorious in Mao Zedong thought than to be
a peasant and, to prove it, the peasants had to work the land. But in hilly,
unproductive Zhejiang, there was little glorious about the land, and Yiwu's people
were starving. Xie decided to follow the old Chinese saying that "the mountains are
high and the emperor is far away."
Without seeking permission, he allowed locals to resuscitate a trade dating from
the Qing dynasty a century before.
They grew sugar and exchanged it with surrounding areas for chicken feathers,
which they made into feather dusters and sold.
The feather duster sellers started hawking other goods. Nearby towns would off-
load their goods on them too. In 1982, after Deng Xiaoping had launched economic
reforms, Yiwu was allowed to set up street markets, an example of Chinese law
following reality.
Id.
221 Chow, supra note 11, at 219. Perhaps it is worth noting here that the ZCSCC "enjoyed a
dramatic surge in growth after privatization." Id. at 218. Two years before the ZCSCC was
privatized, its total revenues were one hundred-million dollars. Id. Three years after its
privatization, the ZCSCC annual revenues increased to $2.2 billion--"a growth rate of about
twenty-two times in a period of five years." Id. Privatization removed the restrictions on the
ZCSCC's use of revenue that were in place while the ZCSCC was still under the control of the
Chinese government. Id. However, privatization also introduced problems, such as conflicts of
interest among government officials who may have gained a private financial interest in the
formerly public entities they were assigned to regulate. See Liu, supra note 18, at 1181.
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officials, but also many of Yiwu's current government officials
regularly hand out name cards bearing the ZCSCC business logo.
222
Professor Chow notes that Yiwu's "placement of key current
government officials in its current management adds to the perception
that the [ZCSCC] operates as an arm of the government. It also
suggests that any attempts to attack the [ZCSCC] will be [met] with
heavy resistance from the local government.,
223
Though trade in counterfeit goods may be more extensive in Yiwu
than in other towns and small cities close to it in size, there are over
one hundred other locations in China that are, like Yiwu, involved
heavily in trading and manufacturing counterfeits. 224 Most have
similar origins and affiliations with the local governments. In
communist China, the State oversees and runs most economic
activities; it also owns much of the property used for commercial
225activities. Thus, the State often plays dual roles in China's trade
activities-that of economic stimulator and that of regulator.226 These
two roles are often at odds with one another. As one commentator
puts it:
By creating distribution channels that manufacture, sell and
deliver phony goods to retail markets and consumers, local
governments often have a financial stake in the very
counterfeiting activity that they are meant to suppress. By
owning, regulating, and operating wholesale distribution
centers, local government officials lease shops to wholesalers
and distributors who may also be potential counterfeiters;
recalcitrant local officials tend to perceive counterfeiting not
as a prohibited act, but as an opportunity to add to their
profits. 227
Typically, the local AIC will invest to renovate or construct the
buildings, outlet stores, booths, stalls, warehouse spaces and other
venue requirements needed for the creation of a wholesaling entity
like that in YiwU. 228 Once vendors have established themselves in the
newly created or renovated wholesaling space, the AIC will charge
222 Chow, supra note 11, at 219.
223 Id. (citations omitted).
224 Id. at 220.
2
2 5 See Liu, supra note 18, at 1180-81 (suggesting that the State's control over most
economic activities in China "may have inadvertently engendered several factors responsible for
the plague of Chinese counterfeit goods").
2261d at 1181.
227 Id. (footnotes omitted).
228 Chow, supra note 214, at 28.
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them rent and monthly maintenance fees of up to 120 U.S. dollars
each.229 For relatively large markets, this may result in total monthly
revenues of 120,000 U.S. dollars and annual revenues of nearly 1.5
million U.S. dollars.23 0 Further, in such markets, it is illegal under
PRC law to do business without an AIC-issued license. 231 "Overall,
the AIC has assumed the roles of investor, manager, regulator, and
law enforcer for these markets. 232 Considering the significant
monetary benefits associated with allowing vendors who may deal in
counterfeit goods to continue doing business, the fact that the AICs
are also responsible for enforcement against trademark infringement
seems a bit suspect, if not wholly at odds with effective trademark-
law enforcement.
5. Enforcement Practices. Corruption and Leniency
To make matters worse, many enforcement officials have been
known to accept gifts, side-payments, and outright bribes--
sometimes known as "case fees"--for conducting trademark-
enforcement actions on behalf of trademark owners.23 3 Though local
AICs initially scoffed at outside pleas to tighten enforcement against
counterfeiters, they quickly came to realize that enforcement on some
level could provide a huge amount of "extra-budgetary income," as
well as extra padding for individual officers' pockets.234 These "case
fees" have run as high as six thousand dollars for the arrest of a single
counterfeiter,235 and it is not uncommon for enforcement officers
directly to demand compensation in exchange for turning guilty
parties over to the Public Security Bureau (PSB), the entity
responsible for criminal prosecutions.236 Often, governmental officials
directly obstruct investigation and confiscation efforts or request that
law enforcement officers treat counterfeiting offenders "leniently"
when they are caught.237
Effective means of redress against local AIC officers who engage
in activities such as these apparently are nonexistent.238 In fact, until
1999, the law permitted local AICS to keep all the money they






234 Mertha Testimony, supra note 191, at 3.
235 Liu, supra note 18, at 1183.
236 Mertha Testimony, supra note 191, at 3.




do so in spite of the fact that the practice is now illegal.239 In the mid-
1990s, the problem of bribery, smuggling, and general corruption
among officials with regard to intellectual-property enforcement was
so widespread that some commentators have likened it to the degree
of corruption surrounding the fall of the Qing Dynasty and the
Nationalist Chinese government. 240 Though China was able through
unified political reform and often draconian criminal penalties to
bring the smuggling aspect of this problem under control over several
years, corruption among some officials and counterfeiting in general
remain pervasive.24'
In recent years, some AICs have shifted policies: instead of
demanding "case fees" or bribes in exchange for handing over
counterfeiters to the PSB, they have come to rely on the money they
collect from the counterfeiters themselves "to enhance their own
official and unofficial operating budgets. 242 This may help explain
why so few cases are referred for criminal prosecution, a phenomenon
noted earlier. If a counterfeiter is convicted, he might go to jail; and if
he goes to jail, he will be put out of business.243 When this happens,
the local AIC loses the revenues it collects through enterprise
registration, regular management fees, and fines for counterfeiting;
additionally, corrupt AIC officials lose the money they skim for
themselves from these resources. 244 The incentives to keep these
forms of revenue available are high, since they are where "the real
money is."'245 As a result, prosecutions are rare. One investigator said
that in his two years working in Shanghai, he never witnessed an AIC
voluntarily turning over a case to the PSB.246 Only fourteen cases
were passed along for criminal prosecution in the first half of 2004.247
In many cases, the AIC will agree to increase the fine-with the
acquiescence of the company upon whom the fine will be levied-in
exchange for being able to keep the case.248 This means that the threat
of criminal sanctions does not constitute a serious deterrent for most
counterfeiters.
239 Mertha Testimony, supra note 191, at 3.
240See Birden, supra note 39, at 477.
241 Chow, supra note 11, at 222.
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C. Silk Street: Another Example of China's Counterfeiting-
Enforcement Problems
Another illustration of China's inability to curb counterfeiting has
followed from a recent Chinese decision in favor of five luxury
brands, including Burberry, LVMH (Louis Vuitton-Moat-Hennessy),
and Gucci, against a Beijing shopping-mall landlord.249 On April 18,
2006, the Beijing High People's Court upheld a previous Beijing No.
2 Intermediate People's Court ruling that the landlord had facilitated
or provided "convenience" to counterfeiters and their activities in
violation of Article 50(2) of the Implementing Regulations of the
2001 Trademark Law. Pursuant this ruling, the court ordered the
Beijing Xiushui Haosen Clothing Market, a landlord at the Silk Street
shopping mall in Beijing near the U.S. Embassy, to compensate each
of the five plaintiff-brands 20,000 yuan, or 2,500 U.S. dollars for its
failure to prohibit the sale of knock-off goods within its premises l.25
This marked the culmination of the first civil action that holders of
foreign well-known marks brought in China against a landlord for
renting space to vendors of counterfeits.252
The five plaintiff brand-owners claim to be happy with the
judgment. 3 They believe it "should send a message to all landlords
in China that they cannot blindly lease their premises to tenants
without taking responsibility for their actions. '254 As Joseph Simone,
who served as counsel for the five plaintiffs, noted, "[w]e want to use
the case to publicize landlord liability, to make them understand that
we could come after them at any time. 255 In fact, the favorable
decision has made possible an agreement between luxury-brand-
owners such as the plaintiffs and Beijing retailers to halt the sale of
pirated goods in China's capital. 56  Under this agreement,
249 Liu Mo & Cao Li, Luxury Brands Win Trademark Suit, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 19, 2006, at
3, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/home/2006-04/19/content_571000.htm.
250 Howard Tsang, Tackling Counterfeiting via Landlords in China, IP RISK MGMT. REV.,
2006, at 40, available at http://www.ipcrimecongress.org/ipcrime2007/documents/IPRMR9.pdf.
25 Mo & Li, supra note 249.
252 Western Brands Win Piracy Suit in Beying, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Jan. 4, 2006,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/01/04/business/prada.php.
253 Mo & Li, supra note 249 (quoting Wang Yadong, legal counsel for the five plaintiffs,
who said "[w]e are satisfied with the final judgment, with the exception of the amount of
compensation"). Initially, each plaintiff demanded 500,000 yuan, or U.S. $62,000. Id. As noted
earlier, this is the maximum penalty available for plaintiffs in trademark protection actions
under the 2001 Trademark Law in China. It is also the amount the Shanghai court awarded to
Starbucks in 2005. See Ping, supra note 3.
254 Western Brands Win Piracy Suit in Beying, supra note 252.
255 Id.




representatives of these foreign luxury brands will monitor shopping
districts in Beijing known for trading in counterfeit goods and report
any violations they see to the vendors' landlords. 257 The landlords, in
turn, must evict tenants who violate the agreement more than once,
under penalty of facing legal action themselves.258
Some brand owners believe that agreements like these will offer
them more protection against counterfeiting than they might get
solely by way of "official" action through the Chinese government.259
According to European Union Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson,
who was present at the June 7, 2006, signing ceremony for the
agreement described above, "[t]his is a protocol with teeth., 260 He
continued, "I hope that increasingly you will see, not just in Beijing
but elsewhere in China: cleaned-up markets, authentic goods and real
action now at long last."
261
However, many Beijing retailers have expressed concern that it
will be impossible to purge trade in counterfeits completely from
large markets, 262 and enforcement in this case certainly has gotten off
to a rocky start. Ten days after the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate
People's Court's initial ruling, in December 2005, against the Silk
Alley landlord, counterfeit Prada and Gucci bags were still available
for purchase in the mall, despite the fact that the defendant had a duty
to "timely and effectively" stop the infringing activity.263 According
to one saleswoman hawking goods at Silk Alley during this time,
"[e]verything here is fake ...[e]veryone knows it's fake." 264 She
offered a bag bearing the Louis Vuitton logo for one hundred yuan, or
about twelve U.S. dollars.265
Notices prohibiting the sale of counterfeits bearing about a dozen
foreign brand names, including Prada, Louis Vuitton, and Chanel, are
now displayed throughout Silk Alley, and many stalls at first blush
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 See Western Brands Win Piracy Suit in Beijing, supra note 252 (quoting James Haynes,
partner at Beijing-based law firm Tee & Howe and co-chairman of the intellectual property
rights committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in China, who noted, "Western
companies can't do anything by themselves, because it's too big a problem, and the Chinese
government can't do anything because the companies aren't involved").260 China to Crack Down on Knock-Offs, supra note 256.
26 1 
Id.
262 Mo and Li, supra note 249.
263 Western Brands Win Piracy Suit in Beijing, supra note 252.
264 Id.
265 Id. Some authentic Louis Vuitton handbags sell for over two thousand U.S. dollars. See
Louis Vuitton Official Website, http://www.louisvuitton.com (follow "USA" hyperlink; then
"catalog" hyperlink; then "women" hyperlink; then "city bags & briefcases" hyperlink; then
"monogram multicolore" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 13, 2008).
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seem to carry generic goods.266 But one showing the slightest interest
in a fake Fendi need not go away discouraged. Passersby cannot help
but hear salespeople whispering "Prada? Prada?" and other
advertisements of their counterfeit wares; 267 in some cases, one
literally must push such salespeople away.268 To avoid potential
trouble, some vendors now keep a bit quieter, opting to store their
stalls' contraband in cupboards and suitcases hidden away from plain
view. 269 Others choose to keep counterfeits in nearby warehouses,
ready for quick delivery to interested customers.27° In any case, the
problem has far from disappeared, and many say it is getting worse.27 1
One should have no difficulty, for example, finding items bearing the
logos of the five luxury brands that "successfully" sued Silk Alley's
landlord.272
Though the central Chinese government often expresses a
seemingly sincere desire to curb these illegal practices, clearly "the
system can't even bring itself to take care of the most blatant
transgressors right in the heart of Beijing.' 273 Local people simply
make too much money selling counterfeits to be deterred,274 and
though enforcement officials conduct periodic raids, "any action
against Silk Alley is purely cosmetic. The big deals take place behind
the scenes, by container-load to Russia, East Europe and South
America.' ' 2 75 Exports such as these benefit both the counterfeiters
themselves and China as a whole.276
Moreover, counterfeiters likely view the periodic fines and
confiscations as merely a cost of doing business. 277 The fine that the
Beijing court issued in this case was similarly low. 278 If Chinese
courts want to prove that they are serious about upholding foreign
brand-owners' trademark rights, they will have to award brand-
owners more than 2,500 U.S. dollars each, which was the award for





268 Simon Elegant, How to Fake Your Way to the Top, TIME, Feb. 12, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1588195,00.html.
269 Mah, supra note 266.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Elegant, supra note 268.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Calum MacLeod, Yiwu: The Only Thing Real in Counterfeit Capital is the, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), Jul. 24, 2000, available at http://fmdarticles.com/p/articles/mi_
qn4158/is 20000724/ai n14335764.
276 See Chow, supra note 11, at 213-15.277 See Chow, supra note 214, at 20.
278 See Mo & Li, supra note 249.
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each plaintiff in the Beijing court, and is an amount just three times
that of the average fine enforcement authorities imposed in 2000.279
Otherwise, counterfeits will not soon disappear; many say they will
never go away.280 Especially in China, where Western-inspired
materialism and average expendable incomes are on the rise-but in
most cases, still do not allow for the purchase of a real Louis Vuitton
handbag-trade in counterfeit goods can only continue to flourish.28'
D. The Convenience of the Starbucks Case
1. The Benefits of Exportation Do Not Apply to Starbucks
In affording Starbucks trademark rights, China can demonstrate to
the international community that it is making progress in the area of
trademark law while refraining, for the time being, from really
addressing the underlying problem. While China often receives great
benefit from the export of counterfeit goods,282 China would have
received little benefit from exportation of the goods Shanghai
Xingbake had to offer. Coffeeshops are more akin to restaurants or
hip clubs than to factories or wholesale markets. People go to them
mainly to buy prepared, immediately consumable items and for the
experience associated with the coffeehouse aesthetic. Whereas it
generally benefits China when counterfeiters ship their goods
overseas, perhaps it goes without saying that a latte with extra foam
would not fare so well in such a situation. Coffeehouse aesthetic
likewise seems wholly non-exportable. Thus, any benefit China
ordinarily receives from the exportation of counterfeits would be
entirely lacking in this case were Shanghai Xingbake allowed to
continue its trademark-infringing operation.
279 See Chow, supra note 11, at 212.
280 See Mah, supra note 266 (quoting the publisher of Madame Figaro, one of China's top
fashion magazines, who said, "I think knockoffs will always exist .... It's a special retail area
that won't disappear").
281 See id. ("Lots of people in China are starting to know good quality and appreciate
beautiful expensive things .... They can't afford the real thing, but still want the prestige of a
name brand-so they buy fakes."); see also Georgia Sauer, Double Take: Shopping Bring on
Dejh Vu? Maybe It's 'Cause Nothing's New, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 2004, at 4 (quoting "an
executive of a leading European luxury goods company") ("Most people who buy on the streets
... know it is not the real product and probably would not buy the original anyway. That is not
the problem. What they don't realize is that counterfeiting is a crime and distribution of
counterfeit goods is a crime. Those manufacturers-often in China-do not pay taxes, do not
pay just wages, might employ children, and the profits are often linked to various criminal
organizations. If you look at the issue from that perspective, it changes everything.").282 See Chow, supra note 11, at 213-15.
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2. Shanghai Does Not Depend upon the Production or Sale of
Counterfeits
Further, Shanghai-where the two branches of Shanghai Xingbake
were located-does not depend upon trademark-infringing
coffeehouses for its economic survival. Nicknamed the "Dragon's
Head" for its economic power and strategic location on the middle of
China's coast at the mouth of the Yangtze River, Shanghai and its
surrounding provinces account for approximately twenty-five percent
of China's gross domestic product.283 Shanghai's port is one of the
two busiest in the world,284 recently surpassing Rotterdam in the total
amount of tonnage it handles.285 Shanghai is a financial hub as well,
where many of the financial institutions that handle China's vast
stores of foreign currency are located.286 It also is home to the world's
fastest train and may soon boast the world's tallest skyscrapers287-a
testament to its financial success and international importance. Unlike
Yiwu, where shutting down the ZCSCC could mean economic
devastation and subsequent ruin for hundreds of thousands of
Chinese,288 Shanghai clearly did not need Shanghai Xingbake in order
to keep its economy afloat. In fact, Shanghai Xingbake operated a
mere two coffeehouses. 289 The revenue Shanghai and China lost from
Shanghai Xingbake's discontinued operation cannot come close to the
money they both will gain as Starbucks continues to invest in the
region.
Shanghai also may use the Starbucks decision to attract other
foreign investors. Over three hundred of the world's Fortune 500
companies already have invested in Shanghai; 290 others may have
refrained from investing, in part, due to concerns about intellectual-
property protection in China. Starbucks' favorable ruling provides
23Joe Havely, Shanghai: China's Business Engine, CNN, Apr. 29, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/04/1 8/eyeonchina.shanghai/index.html.284See Joshua A. Lindenbaum, Assuring the Flow: Maritime Security Challenges and
Trade Between the U.S. and China, 6 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 95, 107 (2006). The other
busiest port is the Port of Hong Kong. Id.
285 Havely, supra note 283.
286 See Keith Bradsher & David Barboza, Hong Kong and Shanghai Vie to Be China's
Financial Center, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 15, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/l 5/
business/hong.php?page=l (noting that Shanghai, "as the historic center of Chinese business
life . . . has emerged as the center of Chinese bond trading and a favorite headquarters for
Chinese and foreign companies"). Shanghai's stock market also out-performed any other in
2006. Id.
287 Id.
288 See Chow, supra note 11, at 219-20 (describing Yiwu's dependence upon its
wholesaling-entity).
us
9 See Ping, supra note 3.
m.o Bradsher & Barboza, supra note 286.
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China with convenient evidence that it is cracking down on
intellectual-property theft. When multinational enterprises express a
reluctance to invest in China, the Chinese government now may offer
the Starbucks decision as proof that their fears are unfounded, though,
in actuality, such proof may be little more than paper-thin.
3. Enforcement and the Special Nature of Starbucks' Goods
One reason for the limited applicability of the Starbucks decision
to other types of intellectual-property infringement in China may lie
in the nature of Starbucks' products. Ordinarily, counterfeiters
capitalize upon a famous-trademark-owner's goodwill by
manufacturing or selling fake products unlawfully bearing the famous
trademark. However, counterfeiters could not easily capitalize on
Starbucks' goodwill in this manner. Though counterfeiters could try
hawking fake Starbucks coffee in street markets-in much the same
way most counterfeit goods are sold in China-such efforts would
miss the mark. That is because Starbucks' success in China may have
very little to do with the coffee at all. One Chinese Starbucks
customer, who drinks coffee in public, but drinks tea at home says, "I
prefer the taste of tea.",291 That preference does not stop him,
however, from joining the millions of emerging Chinese middle class
who enjoy seeing and being seen drinking coffee at hip hangouts like
Starbucks.292 "It's an attitude," he says.293 According to researchers,
one prime "marketing weapon in urban China is to charge more for
public consumption, where price can serve as an indicator of quality
and sophistication. ''294 Of course, the issue of price has not
disappeared for most Chinese. Even with a booming economy and
increasing incomes for many Chinese, at $2.65, a typical Starbucks
coffee is a veritable luxury item for the average Shanghainese
household of three, which brings in about $143 per month.295
Still, most Starbucks customers are "happy with the charges. 296
That is because it is not about the coffee. As one commentator notes,
"[Chinese Starbucks customers] go there to present themselves as
modern Chinese in a public-setting . . . . Chinese are proudly
291 Fowler, supra note 21.
292 1d.
293 Id. Novelist Jonathan Lethem says of Starbucks' appeal: "It's the faint affect of a
counterculture shackled to the most ordinary, slightly upscale product"-part of a kind of "faux-
alternative" aesthetic. Susan Dominus, The Starbucks Aesthetic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2006, at
A25. Herbie Hancock, the famed jazz keyboardist, also notes "you feel kind of hip. I feel kind
of hip when I go to Starbucks .... " Id.
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conspicuous consumers.297 With regard to most consumer goods,
people can demonstrate brand loyalty and "live the lifestyle" that a
famous trademark offers simply by purchasing a counterfeit of the
real thing. This is because many counterfeits, especially "A-level"
fakes--counterfeits so good, they are rumored to be stolen from the
real factories z -are indistinguishable from the authentic product.
Frugal Fendi lovers, therefore, can sport a brand new baguette
without the one thousand dollar price tag. In order to take advantage
of the "lifestyle" Starbucks has to offer, however, one must actually
go to Starbucks. Indeed, it is being at Starbucks that communicates
the Starbucks image, not using a particular type of good-such as a
Starbucks handbag or a Starbucks cell phone. The premium Chinese
consumers seem to place on the public aspect of coffee-drinking and
the status or "attitude" Starbucks represents is especially important in
this regard. As noted earlier, one goes to Starbucks in China primarily
to see and be seen. It is possible, therefore, that Chinese consumers
would consider illicitly buying a cup of fake coffee at a street market
not only to be an act falling short of communicating the Starbucks
"cool," but also to be an act of shame. If this is so, then Starbucks
counterfeiters could not stand a chance in China, since Chinese feel
an almost maniacal cultural compulsion to preserve their personal
image and reputation.299 In any case, the amorphous notion of image
and aesthetic associated with a larger Starbucks coffee-drinking
experience is not something counterfeiters can readily ape in order to
turn a quick profit.
Because of this, Lin, the vice-president of Starbucks' Shanghai
joint-venture partner, the Shanghai President Coffee Corporation,
does not seem worried about competition from knock-off
coffeehouses such as the Taiwan-based Dante Coffee, the Japan-
based Manave Coffee and even McDonald's McCafe.300 He says, "It's
helpful to have more coffee out there, to make people aware of it. But
because of our high quality and service, I believe that the high-end
coffee drinkers will still come to us. '301 Moreover, Starbucks "is
increasingly positioning itself as a purveyor of premium-blend
culture" worldwide, bringing other products such as books, CDs and
films, in addition to coffee into its realm.3 °2 As Howard Shultz puts it,
297 Id.
298 Mab, supra note 266.
299 See Charles A. Miller, II, A Cultural and Historical Perspective to Trademark Law in
China, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103, 115-16 (2004) (describing the Chinese notion of
"face").
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At our core, we're a coffee company, but the opportunity we
have to extend the brand is beyond coffee; it's entertainment.
. . .With the assets Starbucks has in terms of number of
stores, and the trust we have with the brand, and the profile of
our customers, we're in a unique position to partner with
creators of unique content to create an entertainment platform
and an audience that's unparalleled.3 °3
04
Considering Starbucks' power to generate this kind of far-reaching
response seemingly overnight, China had enormous incentive to
encourage Starbucks to invest. As an example of Starbucks'
seemingly limitless ability to expand, Starbucks even managed to
open a store in Beijing's hallowed Forbidden City-an historical
landmark where twenty-four emperors from the Ming (1368-1644
A.D.) and Qing dynasties (1644-1911 A.D.) located their palaces. 30 5
Though Starbucks successfully operated its Forbidden City branch for
seven years, many Chinese became opposed to Starbucks' store in
this location due in large part to Chinese news anchor Rui
Chenggang's popular blog denouncing the Starbucks branch as an
"inappropriate" addition to the Forbidden City and "an erosion of
Chinese Culture., 30 6 Though Starbucks at first resisted local pressure,
popular sentiment finally prevailed, and Starbucks closed its
303 Id.
304 Photo courtesy of BBC News (2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
4712012.stm.
305 See, e.g., China.org.cn, Imperial Palaces of the Ming and Qing Dynasties in Beijing and
Shenyang: The Forbidden City, Feb. 25, 2005, http://www.china.org.cn/english/kuaixun/
74855.htm.
306 Dexter Roberts, Forbidden Starbucks, BUSINESSWEEK, July 16, 2007,
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jul2007/gb20070716_579557.htm?campaign i
d=msnbc. See also Samuel Shen & Yidi Zhao, Forbidden City's Starbucks in Hot Water, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/18/bloomberg/
bxstarbucks.php. Comments on the blog further expressed that the Forbidden City Starbucks is
"a symbol of low-end U.S. food culture" and "an insult to Chinese civilization." Id.
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Forbidden City store on July 13, 2007.307 However, Starbucks quite
reasonably downplays the importance of the store's closure; indeed,
many of those opposed to the store in the Forbidden City do not
oppose Starbucks' expansion in China generally. 30 8 One Chinese
citizen who decried the Forbidden City Starbucks said she goes to
Starbucks several times per week, adding "[i]f I want to go
somewhere to sit down, relax, or read, there is nowhere else I would
go except a Starbucks.,, 30 9 Even Rui Chenggang, who led the
campaign against the Forbidden City Starbucks, admits that
"Starbucks has good quality stuff," and that it is "O.K. to have a
Starbucks around the Forbidden City," just not in the Forbidden
City.
310
With the rate of growth Starbucks is projecting and the apparently
endless opportunities it has to indoctrinate its coffeehouse culture
worldwide, together with its new strategy to offer goods only
marginally related to coffee itself, those worried about losing
traditional Chinese culture may well have much to fear. However, if
China's priority is becoming a dominant player in the world
economy, 31' a ruling against Starbucks would have been downright
foolhardy; in order to attract foreign investors, China must give the
impression that it is willing to protect their intellectual property.
Continued suggestions to the contrary on the part of the Chinese
government could have permanent, financially isolating effects.
4. Icing on the Coffeecake: Starbucks' Humanitarian Efforts in China
Starbucks' plans to promote socially responsible programs in
China constituted yet another incentive for China to grant the
company well-known-trademark rights. In February 2006-just two
months after receiving its favorable ruling in the Shanghai No. 2
Intermediate People's Court-Starbucks pledged to give forty million
yuan, or five million U.S. dollars, and other aid to help poor Chinese
students from rural areas receive better access to education. 2 To
accomplish this goal, Starbucks and the Soong Ching-ling
Foundation, a Chinese social welfare organization, entered into an
307 Roberts, supra note 306.
308 Id.
309Id.
310 d. (emphasis added).
311 See Chow, supra note 11, at 208 (describing China's desire to become a "dominant
economic power in all sectors as quickly as possible").
312Starbucks Donates 1.5 Million Dollars to Boost Rural Education in China,




agreement launching the China Education Project in Beijing.313 The
program will train approximately three thousand female teachers from
one thousand primary and middle schools in five western provinces to
improve their teaching skills, by providing them with updated
learning techniques.3 14 Starbucks Chairman Howard Schultz said of
the program:
Operating with a social conscience has always been core to
the way we do business at Starbucks .... Our objective in
creating the China Education Project is to demonstrate our
long-term commitment to China and take actionable steps
toward supporting the continued education of its young
people. We hope to take an active leadership role in working
with government authorities and local community
organizations to contribute positively to China's educational
programs.
315
Programs such as these allow Starbucks to convey to China the
impression that it is committed not only to investing money for its
own benefit in China, but also to giving back to the greater Chinese
community. Significantly, China places a high premium on bettering
316education. Few other foreign multinational companies have
donated as much money to China-and in agreements as well-
publicized-as Starbucks has in this case.
5. Toyota and Starbucks: Continued Investment Despite an Adverse
Ruling?
In short, the Starbucks case represented a convenient opportunity
for China to show the world that it is serious about protecting
intellectual property-it was, in a sense, a kind of pacifier China
temporarily could offer multinational investors hungry for more
313Id
314Id.
315 Starbucks Supports Educational Programs in China with Commitment of $5 Million,
STARBUCKS COFFEE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY NEWSLETTER, Winter 2006,
http://www.sLarbucks.com/csmewsletter/winter06/csrCommSociety.asp.
316 See JoAn Vaughn, Precious Children: Early Education in China, PBS, 1993, available
at http://www.pbs.org/kcts/preciouschildren/earlyed/read vaughan.html (describing the early-
childhood-education system in China, particularly in light of China's "one-child" policy).
317 Though, interestingly, Toyota is one company that has. See, e.g., Toyota Environmental
Protection Aid Program for China's Youth Hands out Awards, JCNNETWORK, Feb. 13, 2006,
http://www.japancorp.net/Article.Asp?ArtID=1 1889 (describing Toyota's socially responsible
activities throughout the world, which focus on the areas of environmental protection, human-
resources development, and traffic safety). Perhaps it is Toyota's particular choices of
sponsored programs that explain their apparent lack of weight with Chinese courts.
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substantial trademark protection. But what if the Shanghai court had
not granted trademark rights to Starbucks; would Starbucks have
stopped investing there full-stop? Though the reasons for Starbucks to
invest in China at its current rate may have been largely reduced by
all outward appearances, the answer could be no. As noted earlier,
Toyota operates several plants in China whose output collectively
approach 450,000 cars each year.318 Despite the fact that a Beijing
court denied Toyota protection for its famous logo in China in 2003,
Toyota has not scaled back its operations in China and, in fact, plans
to expand there over the next few years.31 9 Specifically, Toyota hopes
to seize ten percent of the Chinese market in passenger cars by
2010.320 As part of this plan, Toyota will open another plant in China
in mid-2007 and increase production at its other Chinese facilities for
a total annual output of 693,000 automobiles.32' Clearly, Toyota, with
such ambitious plans for its future in China, has been left undeterred
by Chinese refusal to bestow upon its trademarks "well-known"
status.
Given the particular nature of Starbucks' products and brand
appeal-and the difficulty inherent in counterfeiting them-it is
possible that Starbucks similarly would have forged ahead in China
despite an unfavorable ruling, because it would not be hurt greatly by
doing so. This may be evidence that the Shanghai court ruled for
Starbucks, less out of a desire to afford real trademark rights to any
one foreign brand owner, and more because doing so meant an easy
way to convey a seemingly powerful signal to foreign investors at
large. Whether Starbucks would have followed Toyota's lead in the
event of an adverse decision is now a question for the ages-a good
one, perhaps, to ponder over coffee.
CONCLUSION
On its surface, the Starbucks decision may appear to be a
significant victory for well-known-mark-holders in China. However,
trademark protection in China may well have more to do with the
type of goods the mark-holder purveys and the extent to which China
will benefit from the continued infringement of such trademarks than
with a more unified, multinational corporation-friendly application of
the law. China's problem with counterfeiting is widespread and
deeply rooted. Enforcement is lacking, in part, because both China
318 Toyota Targeting China, India Markets, supra note 93.
3 19
See id.320 Dawson, supra note 92.
32! Toyota Targeting China, India Markets, supra note 93.
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and local counterfeiters benefit significantly from their continued
violation of domestic and international trademark law. Direct and
indirect government involvement with counterfeiting operations, as
well as corruption and leniency among enforcement officials,
compounds the enforcement problem. Many foreign brand owners,
such as Louis Vuitton and Fendi, suffer continued violations of their
trademarks due to these rampant enforcement difficulties--despite
favorable rulings in Chinese courts.
Moreover, China's trademark laws are ambiguous, and many
foreign well-known-mark-holders have not been able to receive even
nominal protection for their famous marks, despite repeated pleas to
the various branches of the Chinese government. Toyota's fate in
Beijing could be indicative of widespread reluctance among Chinese
courts to grant well-known status to foreign marks. If this proves to
be true, the current climate regarding intellectual property
enforcement in China could remain the same indefinitely, and
multinational investors, no doubt, will be wary of further investment
in China.
The Starbucks case presented a unique opportunity for the Chinese
government to attempt to dispel fears among multinational investors
concerning intellectual-property protection in China. But Starbucks'
victory may be an isolated one. While most foreign investors sell
material goods such as leather bags and cell phones, Starbucks offers
amorphous, ephemeral items such as image, aesthetic experience, and
hot coffee. Distinguishing characteristics like these could mean the
difference between intellectual-property theft and protection for a
multinational entity in China. Whether other foreign investors will be
able to use the Starbucks decision effectively to their own advantage
has yet to be seen. For the time being, however, Starbucks can "rest"
assured that China at least will protect Starbucks, should any other
Chinese companies unlawfully attempt to capitalize upon its
particular brand of caffeinated culture.
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